The case of the European Union is an extraordinary one, with roots stretching back to the European Economic Community in order to integrate Europe’s economy in the hopes of avoiding a third world war. Thomas Friedman notes this in his book, The World is Flat¸ indicating that we are entering into a feasibly Post-War era because of economic integration. While Friedman is not the subject of this discussion, he offers an interesting perspective.
The E.U. is also interesting because it does seem to indicate a change in the realm of international politics and political structure, it is one of the more successfully supra-national organizations, bringing to mind the question of whether we are entering into a Post-Westphalia system of international relations. Wright, however, brings up interesting points using Great Britain and the movements (compounded by recent discoveries of oil off the coast of Scotland) for sovereignty in Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland – in the case of Northern Ireland, a return to the Republic of Ireland rather than sovereignty. Many of these issues were mitigated by the introduction of devolution, or allowing more sovereignty in these areas in order to appease those populations.
Whether the European Union will ultimately be successful in its endeavors remains to be determined, however, it is acting contrary to the individual interests of its member states, seeming to progress in the opposite direction of Great Britain. Giving member states greater amounts of autonomy would possibly undermine its entire goal, however, in order to avoid greater stresses, it may have to do so.
Thursday, October 30, 2008
John Leer's Response #1
Judt’s discussion in the Epilogue of exiles, namely Jewish exiles, during and after WWII provides a clear analytical framework that demonstrates the conceptual and practical necessity of postnational governing bodies such as the European Union.
The statist system formalized in the Treaty of Westphalia grants states complete sovereignty over the treatment of the state’s resources and population. In many ways, WWII and Nazi Germany serve as an end, at least conceptually, to this system in that it becomes clear that humans have certain rights not by virtue of their status as a citizen but, rather, by virtue of their status as humans. Thus, the criminals indicted at the Nuremberg Trials were charged with ‘crimes against humanity’. In charging the Nazis with this crime, the Allied Forces (and later the signatories of the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights) essentially said that there are limits to a state’s sovereignty.
Once we grant that states’ actions must fall within certain boundaries and that they must fulfill certain obligations to their citizens by virtue of them being humans, the problem becomes ensuring that those people who are not citizens are still granted this obligatory status. Judt discusses at length the problems facing deportees and exiles during and after the war; they were consistently and systematically excluded from the benefits enjoyed by ‘full citizens’ and found it nearly impossible to file grievances in search of compensation. Among many other similar excerpts, Judt writes:
Indeed, in Belgium the exclusion of Jews from any post-war benefits was taken a step further. Since 95 percent of the Jews deported from Belgium had been foreign nationals or stateless, it was determined by a post-war law that – unless they had also fought in the organized resistance movements – surviving Jews who ended up in Belgium after the war would not be eligible for any public aid. (805)
In fact, by 1945 the Swiss had taken in just 28,000 Jews—seven thousand of them before the war began. …the Swiss had made strenuous efforts to keep Jews out… (813)
Upon making similar historical observations, Hannah Arendt accurately comments that exiles and deportees suffer not just from a lack of rights, but rather from a lack of rights to have rights. In other words, these non-citizens are not the sort of entity that can bear rights within a strictly statist system. Thus, although the Nuremberg Trials clearly asserted that humans enjoy certain rights above those that stem from citizenship, it remained the case that one had to be a citizen in order to receive them.
The political (as opposed to the economic) development of the EU has taken great strides to remedy this conflict in establishing the European Court of Justice, thereby granting exiles an avenue to seek justice. However, a great separation still exists between citizens and non-citizens with respect to issues of positive right, namely regarding welfare benefits.
The statist system formalized in the Treaty of Westphalia grants states complete sovereignty over the treatment of the state’s resources and population. In many ways, WWII and Nazi Germany serve as an end, at least conceptually, to this system in that it becomes clear that humans have certain rights not by virtue of their status as a citizen but, rather, by virtue of their status as humans. Thus, the criminals indicted at the Nuremberg Trials were charged with ‘crimes against humanity’. In charging the Nazis with this crime, the Allied Forces (and later the signatories of the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights) essentially said that there are limits to a state’s sovereignty.
Once we grant that states’ actions must fall within certain boundaries and that they must fulfill certain obligations to their citizens by virtue of them being humans, the problem becomes ensuring that those people who are not citizens are still granted this obligatory status. Judt discusses at length the problems facing deportees and exiles during and after the war; they were consistently and systematically excluded from the benefits enjoyed by ‘full citizens’ and found it nearly impossible to file grievances in search of compensation. Among many other similar excerpts, Judt writes:
Indeed, in Belgium the exclusion of Jews from any post-war benefits was taken a step further. Since 95 percent of the Jews deported from Belgium had been foreign nationals or stateless, it was determined by a post-war law that – unless they had also fought in the organized resistance movements – surviving Jews who ended up in Belgium after the war would not be eligible for any public aid. (805)
In fact, by 1945 the Swiss had taken in just 28,000 Jews—seven thousand of them before the war began. …the Swiss had made strenuous efforts to keep Jews out… (813)
Upon making similar historical observations, Hannah Arendt accurately comments that exiles and deportees suffer not just from a lack of rights, but rather from a lack of rights to have rights. In other words, these non-citizens are not the sort of entity that can bear rights within a strictly statist system. Thus, although the Nuremberg Trials clearly asserted that humans enjoy certain rights above those that stem from citizenship, it remained the case that one had to be a citizen in order to receive them.
The political (as opposed to the economic) development of the EU has taken great strides to remedy this conflict in establishing the European Court of Justice, thereby granting exiles an avenue to seek justice. However, a great separation still exists between citizens and non-citizens with respect to issues of positive right, namely regarding welfare benefits.
Wednesday, October 29, 2008
Post War and Wright
In the Introduction to British Politics by Wright, in the very first pages, he describes the British government as a “strong government.” He continues to state that the transition democracy didn’t weaken the British government, but rather strengthen it. The British government was also became stronger and maintained stability during World War II. But we see in The PostWar that this was not the case in Germany. Germany endured extreme circumstances after World War II. The government as well as the economy almost collapsed. As Judt states, The war was not over 1945, he states that millions died after 1945 in result of the war. In Europe a mostly non-democratic, but communist states, were defeated and must rebuilding was needed in Europe? So why didn’t Europe, especially Germany, move towards democracy?
Judt probably answers this question in his book, but I haven’t gotten that far. :/ (hopefully I will). Judt says in Post war that some might say that many would say that the reason for Britain’s stability was planning. In agreement with Judt, I don’t think that this is the answer. In Britain very little planning took place. The real issue was control. The British government nationalized everything from railroads, mines, and transportation. The government took control of everything in Britain Post War. Although this control help stabilize Britain as a whole, I believe the fact that the British didn’t turn away from the government of “tradition” is the main reason for such success. The British knew what they wanted and never attempted to change the make-up of their government, but only make alterations as they went along, as Wright says. The Unconstitutional government of Britain help them transition through the Post war in my opinion, Bottom Line.
This is not to say that British has the perfect government. Like all political structures, I believe it has its flaws and some that in my opinion will cause problems in the future. One thing that grabs my attention the party system in Britain. Wright says that parties are organizers of political choice. I take this to mean that parties can sway people to think a certain way on a topic, even if they don;t agree with it, because they are apart of a certain party. Wright says that party politics in which disciplines of party loyalty stifle independent though and action. People will conform for some ideas that they naturally disagree with. I believe, like Wright that the party system may not still be OK for British politics and it is going to have to change, if it wants to continue to be a "strong" government.
Judt probably answers this question in his book, but I haven’t gotten that far. :/ (hopefully I will). Judt says in Post war that some might say that many would say that the reason for Britain’s stability was planning. In agreement with Judt, I don’t think that this is the answer. In Britain very little planning took place. The real issue was control. The British government nationalized everything from railroads, mines, and transportation. The government took control of everything in Britain Post War. Although this control help stabilize Britain as a whole, I believe the fact that the British didn’t turn away from the government of “tradition” is the main reason for such success. The British knew what they wanted and never attempted to change the make-up of their government, but only make alterations as they went along, as Wright says. The Unconstitutional government of Britain help them transition through the Post war in my opinion, Bottom Line.
This is not to say that British has the perfect government. Like all political structures, I believe it has its flaws and some that in my opinion will cause problems in the future. One thing that grabs my attention the party system in Britain. Wright says that parties are organizers of political choice. I take this to mean that parties can sway people to think a certain way on a topic, even if they don;t agree with it, because they are apart of a certain party. Wright says that party politics in which disciplines of party loyalty stifle independent though and action. People will conform for some ideas that they naturally disagree with. I believe, like Wright that the party system may not still be OK for British politics and it is going to have to change, if it wants to continue to be a "strong" government.
Reading Response #1
For me, the most important idea that our class lectures, the Wright book, and the Judt book have all touched upon with regard to the European Union is the importance of identity politics. In class professor King noted Kissinger’s comic remark about phoning Europe, but it is certainly indicative of a larger issue. It calls into question what it means to be European and how that can be identified. Perhaps more importantly, even if we can establish what it means to be European, it is inevitably going to require a multicultural definition that also calls into question not only the types of policies that the EU can enact (especially at the second and third pillar of European integration) but also the extent to which the EU can expand before it kills the possibility of actually defining what it means to be European beyond mere geographical distinctions.
For example, the Wright book which we discussed last week showed how in Britain the development of various factions within merely the UK, which is a much smaller entity than the EU, has been solved through devolution. Devolution was necessary in Britain because individuals identified more with Scotland, for example, than they did with Britain. In a similar fashion, the EU looks as if it can only succeed to the extent that it enables people to be European over being British, Belgian, German, etc. because the EU seeks to do the opposite of devolve power – its goal is to elevate issues to a body with supranational authority.
Although Wright hinted to the possibility that the EU may have had some success in causing even Britain with its stable political tradition to accept such an authority, Judt’s analysis of postwar Europe suggests that the EU “project” must first resolve issues of identity before it can delve into substantive issues beyond economic policy. Judt makes a striking comment in his introduction about how the destruction of a multicultural identity within European states actually laid the foundation for the postwar success of those states. He says that Stalin and Hitler provided the foundation for the successes of the modern, progressive European welfare state by “[blasting] flat the demographic heath upon which the foundations of a new and less complicated continent were then laid” (9).
Fast forward to today and the enlargement of EU has brought back all the issues of identity that the world wars had in some twisted ways resolved by pushing everyone into “their own country” where they lived among “their own people.” From everything I’ve read on the issue, the biggest barrier to Turkey’s inclusion, for example, may not be its political structure as much as its strong Muslim cultural heritage. Is being European, then, fundamentally being Christian? Or is it not being Muslim? Or both? Or neither?
Judt underlines this fact when he says that “Europe is facing a multicultural future,” and that this “has thrown into relief not just Europe’s current discomfort at the prospect of ever greater variety, but also the ease with which the dead ‘others’ of Europe’s past were cast far out of mind” (9). This ultimately presents the most important dilemma for the expansion of the EU and its authority. As the definition of what it means to be European expands and encompasses more cultures and peoples, its identity becomes murkier. Expansion strengthens the power of the EU, but weakens European identity, a fundamental source of its legitimacy and power. Finally, identity is often characterized in opposition, i.e. in contrast to the “other” that Judt is referring to and it is worth noting that US policymakers would thus be wise to make sure that the EU does not define itself in contrast to America in the future.
For example, the Wright book which we discussed last week showed how in Britain the development of various factions within merely the UK, which is a much smaller entity than the EU, has been solved through devolution. Devolution was necessary in Britain because individuals identified more with Scotland, for example, than they did with Britain. In a similar fashion, the EU looks as if it can only succeed to the extent that it enables people to be European over being British, Belgian, German, etc. because the EU seeks to do the opposite of devolve power – its goal is to elevate issues to a body with supranational authority.
Although Wright hinted to the possibility that the EU may have had some success in causing even Britain with its stable political tradition to accept such an authority, Judt’s analysis of postwar Europe suggests that the EU “project” must first resolve issues of identity before it can delve into substantive issues beyond economic policy. Judt makes a striking comment in his introduction about how the destruction of a multicultural identity within European states actually laid the foundation for the postwar success of those states. He says that Stalin and Hitler provided the foundation for the successes of the modern, progressive European welfare state by “[blasting] flat the demographic heath upon which the foundations of a new and less complicated continent were then laid” (9).
Fast forward to today and the enlargement of EU has brought back all the issues of identity that the world wars had in some twisted ways resolved by pushing everyone into “their own country” where they lived among “their own people.” From everything I’ve read on the issue, the biggest barrier to Turkey’s inclusion, for example, may not be its political structure as much as its strong Muslim cultural heritage. Is being European, then, fundamentally being Christian? Or is it not being Muslim? Or both? Or neither?
Judt underlines this fact when he says that “Europe is facing a multicultural future,” and that this “has thrown into relief not just Europe’s current discomfort at the prospect of ever greater variety, but also the ease with which the dead ‘others’ of Europe’s past were cast far out of mind” (9). This ultimately presents the most important dilemma for the expansion of the EU and its authority. As the definition of what it means to be European expands and encompasses more cultures and peoples, its identity becomes murkier. Expansion strengthens the power of the EU, but weakens European identity, a fundamental source of its legitimacy and power. Finally, identity is often characterized in opposition, i.e. in contrast to the “other” that Judt is referring to and it is worth noting that US policymakers would thus be wise to make sure that the EU does not define itself in contrast to America in the future.
Reading Response #1
In British Politics, A Very Short Introduction, Tony Wright identifies key characteristics and ideas of the British tradition, and investigates what makes British politics distinctive. Three things that I found interesting while reading the book were: even though the British system is changing there is still an idea of it remaining constant, the lack of parameters that exist if a party has a majority in the commons, and the idea of devolution.
“The country’s distinctive contribution to civilization has been the development of stable institutions of representative government” (2). What makes the British political system unique is that their constitution is not a set of written laws that must be followed, it is a common law constitution that is continually being “shaped and reshaped by political circumstances and so forever on the move.” Wright argues that even when the reality changes and the British system has fluctuated the outward appearance of British politics looks relatively the same, providing the people with a sense of continuity.
In the British political system, all that is needed to give a party a free governing landscape is a parliamentary majority. “Once in secure possession of this, there was no constitutional rule-book to define the parameters of your power” (13). You could essentially do whatever you want. There is no system of checks and balances or separation of powers. This idea of free reign seems to be a problem due to the absence of a formal written constitution.
There is also this idea of the British political system as changing. This is seen in particular through devolution. For the British political system the devolution of power to Scotland and Wales represented “a fundamental break with a traditionally centralized and unitary state” (28). As of now, the people who argued that it was necessary to change the union in order to save it have been vindicated, but the fact that Scotland and Wales are already demanding more power only tells of future challenges to come…
“The country’s distinctive contribution to civilization has been the development of stable institutions of representative government” (2). What makes the British political system unique is that their constitution is not a set of written laws that must be followed, it is a common law constitution that is continually being “shaped and reshaped by political circumstances and so forever on the move.” Wright argues that even when the reality changes and the British system has fluctuated the outward appearance of British politics looks relatively the same, providing the people with a sense of continuity.
In the British political system, all that is needed to give a party a free governing landscape is a parliamentary majority. “Once in secure possession of this, there was no constitutional rule-book to define the parameters of your power” (13). You could essentially do whatever you want. There is no system of checks and balances or separation of powers. This idea of free reign seems to be a problem due to the absence of a formal written constitution.
There is also this idea of the British political system as changing. This is seen in particular through devolution. For the British political system the devolution of power to Scotland and Wales represented “a fundamental break with a traditionally centralized and unitary state” (28). As of now, the people who argued that it was necessary to change the union in order to save it have been vindicated, but the fact that Scotland and Wales are already demanding more power only tells of future challenges to come…
Monday, October 27, 2008
Midterm Examination Key
Midterm Examination Key
Instructions: Write your answers to the questions below in the blue book. Be sure to number each question. Please write legibly.
Note: Georgetown University is an honor-code school for undergraduates. Cases of suspected academic dishonesty will be handled according to the university’s honor code.
Part I Short Answer (Your response should be no more than a few sentences or a list. 10 pts. each)
1. Briefly describe Marx’s concept of “ideology.”
Best answer should be clearly written and should contain some combination of:
-materialism or historical materialism
-base/superstructure
-relations of production
-system of ideas, culture, beliefs
-causality (ideology as lacking independent causal significance)
-epiphenomenon
-justification / legitimation of relations of production / class relations
-telos / teleology
E.g., ideology is the system of ideas, beliefs, and culture that justifies particular relations of production. This flows from Marx’s materialist conception of history and social life. Material relations are part of the base; ideology and other social epiphenomena are part of superstructure, having no independent causal effects.
2. What is a Condorcet cycle? Does one always occur?
This is the production of incoherent/irrational/intransitive group preference from otherwise rational individual preferences. It does not always occur; in most cases with very limited players and very limited preferences, cycles are unlikely. As you increase both the number of players and the number of preferences, however, the probability of a cycle increases.
Best answers were very clear in the language they used to refer to the group and individual preferences; they mentioned “rational individuals” or “transitive individual preferences” and “irrational” or “intransitive” group preferences arrived at by “aggregation” of individual preferences. They also, in many cases, showed an example (A>B>C>A).
Also, it is important to note that this question had two parts. Best answers to the second part referred to factors that increase the probability of cycles (i.e. group size and preference number).
3. State Arrow’s theorem. What is its significance?
There is no system of translating coherent/rational individual preferences into group preference that does not also either (1) produce irrational/incoherent group preferences or (2) restrict the expression of individual preferences (either across all of society or amongst certain groups, or both). Thus, there is a tradeoff between social rationality and concentration of power. This is “significance” because it means that there is no “natural” majority will and that we must devise sets of rules for determining what we want to count as a majority/group will.
Again, best answers had to give clear responses to both parts of the question.
Part II Long Short Answer (Your answer should be a paragraph. 20 pts. each)
4. Give TWO alternative definitions of a “state” based on lectures, class readings, and discussion sections.
There were a range of possible good responses here. Some possibilities included:
-Marxist
-Institutionalist
-Functionalist
-Weber’s definition
-Aristotle’s definition
-Professor King’s definition of contemporary states from lecture
Most important was to demonstrate your ability to think through two conceptually distinct ways of seeing the idea of a state. The best answers did not simply incorporate the material presented on slides in lecture; they also referred to readings or other sources outside the lecture. The best answers also did not simply restate two definitions from memory (this would receive approximately a B if both definitions were solid), but offered at least some short explanation of where these two definitions came from, how they were different, and why that difference was significant. This could refer, for example, to the malleability of the concept of state and the different types of entities it could include (depending on definition).
5. Describe how plurality, majority, and closed party-list electoral systems work.
A minimally acceptable answer (that is, something in the C to B range) included:
Plurality: most votes wins
Majority: 50% plus one to win; second round if no one achieves this in first round
Party-list: vote for individual parties rather than candidates (in close list form); seats apportioned according to some proportional formula.
Best answers went into district magnitude, allocation method, form of candidature, etc. An answer could also get top credit if it included almost all of this information on each system and also mentioned some of the effects of each system.
6. What is “civil society”? How does the idea of “social capital” relate to it?
A minimally acceptable answer (that is, something in the C to B range, so about 14-17 depending on precision, etc.) included:
Secondary forms of association in society (interest groups, non-state organizations, durable social networks, etc) that exist midway between and help mediate relations between primary social groups (families/ kinship groups) and the state. Social capital as glue/connections among groups within civil society. Some reference to the several components of social capital mentioned in lecture.
Best answers nailed the definition of civil society (either that given in lecture or a similar variant drawn from a seminal text on the subject), demonstrated a clear understanding of the concept of social capital (describing or defining it in terms of “norms,” “trust,” “reciprocity,” and “networks”), demonstrated a clear distinction between these concepts and then showed how they were related, and referenced some of the relevant authors (Putnam, Tocqueville, etc) that we have discussed in relation to these concepts and findings. The discussion of the relationship between civil society and social capital could argue that social capital helps facilitate strong civil society (by allowing people to engage more fruitfully in collective action) or that civil society generally builds social capital (by bringing more people into contact with each other, building networks, and facilitating trust and reciprocity with individuals outside the immediate family). The very best answers pointed to both of these dynamics and linked them to the authors.
7. What is “the tragedy of the commons”? How does it relate to the idea of a public good?
The minimal correct answer (again, about C-B or 14-17/20) included a description of the “tragedy” as the diminution of common pool resources as a result of the individual rational self-interest maximization of all group members. The answer also had to include some notion of “public good” and how it related to the “tragedy.”
Better answers mentioned the distinction between public and private goods, using terms such as rivalrous/nonrivalrous and excludable/nonexcludable. The very best answers also showed consciousness of the difference between “public goods” (that are nonrivalrous, such as a lighthouse or public transportation service), “common goods” (that are rivalrous, such as the park bench or natural resources), and the differences and similarities between the problems that relate to each (collective action problems, free rider problem, tragedy of the commons). These answers also mentioned some of the ways in which authors (Hardin, Olson) recommend addressing these problems and protecting public and common goods (regulation, privatization, selective incentives).
8. How do we judge whether some theories in political science are better than others?
The minimal answer (about C- or 13/20) for this question included at least a reference to all five of the characteristics we discussed in class: generality, accuracy, parsimony, falsifiability, and causality. Additional credit was given for accurate descriptions of each of these (through about B+ or 18/20). The very best answers did a little more than just list these characteristics and their definitions, also mentioning the tradeoff between accuracy and generality, the significance of falsifiability (as opposed to earlier notions of verification), and possibly providing a couple of illustrations.
Part III Essay (70 pts.)
Choose ONE of the following. Remember: Your essay must make an argument by staking out a position and then supporting that position with evidence.
A. Describe the effects of different electoral systems on the outcome of elections. That is, how do the methods we use affect the answers we get? And why is there such a diversity of electoral systems in use around the world?
B. Using what you know of models and theories in political science, design a political science research project to test any of the various theories of any ONE of the following: Marx, Weber, Huntington, Hardin, Duverger. Describe such a project, its structure, its sources of data, and its chief hypothesis.
C. Describe and analyze a real-world collective action problem that we have not discussed during lectures. What allowed the collective action problem to be overcome, or what prevented collective action from occurring?
For the essays, length is not the sole criterion, but in general they should be about 2-3 pages or so of text at a minimum. Foremost was whether the essay answered the question. Then, I was looking for some clarity of argument—a set of coherent points supported with some evidence. Reference to readings was definitely a plus and often was a major part of what distinguished a genuinely “A” answer from the rest.
On essay A, it was vital to realize that there were two parts of the question and to make sure to address each of these. First, you needed to give some general explanation of how electoral systems affect outcomes (many people very thoughtfully framed this in terms of Condorcet, Arrow, the lack of a majority will apart from the institutions used to measure it, etc), and you needed to describe what the effects are of different systems. It was key that you needed to really talk about the EFFECTS of electoral rules. Answers that simply described each system (which you already did for question 5 above) were not awarded nearly as many points. Some of the factors we were looking for included (though not limited to): compromise/inclusiveness, efficiency/effectiveness, accountability, stability, simplicity/tradition, number of parties usually generated, representativeness (of minorities, women, etc), centripitalism/moderation, affects on multi-ethnic populations, how issues get divided amongst parties, preference salience, etc.
For the second question, you had make a theoretical argument as to what accounts for the wide variety of electoral systems that exist internationally. Ideally, your answer to this question was stated as a clear thesis in your introduction and was then either addressed alongside the effects or was handled in the second part of your essay. You needed to demonstrate some knowledge, based on the readings, of why countries might choose or end up with different systems, either based on those systems’ effects (e.g., in cases of ethnically divided societies) or based on history/values. The very best answers addressed the different paths by which electoral systems are created in different states: some by gradual historical evolution or carryover from earlier institutions, some by conscious values- or needs- based choice (where a system was selected to best protect values held by that society or to best handle particular social or demographic tensions). As long as a strong argument was made and backed up by some supporting evidence, however, there was a fair degree of flexibility in acceptable answers (historical path dependency, conscious choice, values, needs of a particular type of society, etc).
Authors that were relevant to this question included: Condorcet, Arrow, Reilly, Norris, Lijphart, Soudriette and Ellis, Burke, Mirabeau, Duverger, North, Rosenfeld, Alesina, …
The very best answers were well structured as responses to both questions, dealt with most of the major systems that we had studied (i.e., plurality, majority, proportional representation, preferential, and possibly the mixed types STV and AV), marshaled the ideas of a number of different authors, referred to at least a few examples of countries to demonstrate points, and made a clear thoughtful argument concerning the origins of variation in system design (not just a quick response in the final paragraph to this part of the question).
Essay B: For this question I wanted to see clear scientific reasoning. You needed to describe clearly what the theoretical model was you planned to test, and then develop an experiment in order to test it. In addition to showing full understanding of the theory being tested, your answer needed to also demonstrate a clear grasp of scientific method and theory judgment criteria. You needed to be conscious of how to apply concepts such as falsifiability and generality to the evaluation of a real theoretical model. (Implicitly, you must show that the theory you intend to test is falsifiable. Also, one clear mistake here was to conceptualize the test as an attempt to “prove” the model correct. This failed to grasp the idea that theories cannot be verified through experimentation, only falsified.)
Best answers laid out a clear neat experimental design, thoughtfully considered the data sources to be used, and correctly identified what hypothesized outcome would correspond with the theory’s predictions and which hypothesized outcome would violate these expectations and falsify the theory. Best answers also generally included some reference to the general principles by which good theories can be judged (discussed in question 8).
Essay C: This essay required that you develop a clear example that demonstrated your comfortable with key concepts from collective action theory and that you can see how these interrelate and apply to real world problems. Your answer had to include: a clear description of the collective action problem at hand, a description of what happened and if the problem was ever overcome, and an explanation for why this was and what factors either allowed or prevented collective action from occurring.
Best answers to this question showed precisely how the problem they had described could be modeled in terms of collective action theory concepts. They clearly identified who the (potential) collective actors were (individuals, groups, countries, etc), what their interests were, and what public or common good was at stake. This last element was particularly relevant, because it requires reframing the “collective action” problem to think “what is in this for everybody?” There are some things that we inherently know are collective action problems, but we do not usually think of in terms of the non-excludable good that they provide. But reframing the question in terms of what the benefit is that all group members can expect (at least in the long term) can help generate a more fruitful analysis of the individual group member’s rational weighting of interests and how that might have led to the particular outcome being explained.
Best answers to this question demonstrated a familiarity with the theoretical explanations for what factors make collective action problems easier or harder to solve. This might include: group size, anonymity versus reputation, values and norms of behavior, individual rationality, free rider and tragedy of the commons problems, levels of social capital (norms of trust and reciprocity in the given group or society, pre-existing networks of relationships), regulation, privatization, and selective incentives. Best answers also referenced some of the literature we have read or discussed on this or closely related and relevant subjects (Olson, Hardin, Putnam, Tocqueville,…) Clear logical argument justifying a plausible causal explanation for the collective action outcome (i.e. success or failure) was also key.
Instructions: Write your answers to the questions below in the blue book. Be sure to number each question. Please write legibly.
Note: Georgetown University is an honor-code school for undergraduates. Cases of suspected academic dishonesty will be handled according to the university’s honor code.
Part I Short Answer (Your response should be no more than a few sentences or a list. 10 pts. each)
1. Briefly describe Marx’s concept of “ideology.”
Best answer should be clearly written and should contain some combination of:
-materialism or historical materialism
-base/superstructure
-relations of production
-system of ideas, culture, beliefs
-causality (ideology as lacking independent causal significance)
-epiphenomenon
-justification / legitimation of relations of production / class relations
-telos / teleology
E.g., ideology is the system of ideas, beliefs, and culture that justifies particular relations of production. This flows from Marx’s materialist conception of history and social life. Material relations are part of the base; ideology and other social epiphenomena are part of superstructure, having no independent causal effects.
2. What is a Condorcet cycle? Does one always occur?
This is the production of incoherent/irrational/intransitive group preference from otherwise rational individual preferences. It does not always occur; in most cases with very limited players and very limited preferences, cycles are unlikely. As you increase both the number of players and the number of preferences, however, the probability of a cycle increases.
Best answers were very clear in the language they used to refer to the group and individual preferences; they mentioned “rational individuals” or “transitive individual preferences” and “irrational” or “intransitive” group preferences arrived at by “aggregation” of individual preferences. They also, in many cases, showed an example (A>B>C>A).
Also, it is important to note that this question had two parts. Best answers to the second part referred to factors that increase the probability of cycles (i.e. group size and preference number).
3. State Arrow’s theorem. What is its significance?
There is no system of translating coherent/rational individual preferences into group preference that does not also either (1) produce irrational/incoherent group preferences or (2) restrict the expression of individual preferences (either across all of society or amongst certain groups, or both). Thus, there is a tradeoff between social rationality and concentration of power. This is “significance” because it means that there is no “natural” majority will and that we must devise sets of rules for determining what we want to count as a majority/group will.
Again, best answers had to give clear responses to both parts of the question.
Part II Long Short Answer (Your answer should be a paragraph. 20 pts. each)
4. Give TWO alternative definitions of a “state” based on lectures, class readings, and discussion sections.
There were a range of possible good responses here. Some possibilities included:
-Marxist
-Institutionalist
-Functionalist
-Weber’s definition
-Aristotle’s definition
-Professor King’s definition of contemporary states from lecture
Most important was to demonstrate your ability to think through two conceptually distinct ways of seeing the idea of a state. The best answers did not simply incorporate the material presented on slides in lecture; they also referred to readings or other sources outside the lecture. The best answers also did not simply restate two definitions from memory (this would receive approximately a B if both definitions were solid), but offered at least some short explanation of where these two definitions came from, how they were different, and why that difference was significant. This could refer, for example, to the malleability of the concept of state and the different types of entities it could include (depending on definition).
5. Describe how plurality, majority, and closed party-list electoral systems work.
A minimally acceptable answer (that is, something in the C to B range) included:
Plurality: most votes wins
Majority: 50% plus one to win; second round if no one achieves this in first round
Party-list: vote for individual parties rather than candidates (in close list form); seats apportioned according to some proportional formula.
Best answers went into district magnitude, allocation method, form of candidature, etc. An answer could also get top credit if it included almost all of this information on each system and also mentioned some of the effects of each system.
6. What is “civil society”? How does the idea of “social capital” relate to it?
A minimally acceptable answer (that is, something in the C to B range, so about 14-17 depending on precision, etc.) included:
Secondary forms of association in society (interest groups, non-state organizations, durable social networks, etc) that exist midway between and help mediate relations between primary social groups (families/ kinship groups) and the state. Social capital as glue/connections among groups within civil society. Some reference to the several components of social capital mentioned in lecture.
Best answers nailed the definition of civil society (either that given in lecture or a similar variant drawn from a seminal text on the subject), demonstrated a clear understanding of the concept of social capital (describing or defining it in terms of “norms,” “trust,” “reciprocity,” and “networks”), demonstrated a clear distinction between these concepts and then showed how they were related, and referenced some of the relevant authors (Putnam, Tocqueville, etc) that we have discussed in relation to these concepts and findings. The discussion of the relationship between civil society and social capital could argue that social capital helps facilitate strong civil society (by allowing people to engage more fruitfully in collective action) or that civil society generally builds social capital (by bringing more people into contact with each other, building networks, and facilitating trust and reciprocity with individuals outside the immediate family). The very best answers pointed to both of these dynamics and linked them to the authors.
7. What is “the tragedy of the commons”? How does it relate to the idea of a public good?
The minimal correct answer (again, about C-B or 14-17/20) included a description of the “tragedy” as the diminution of common pool resources as a result of the individual rational self-interest maximization of all group members. The answer also had to include some notion of “public good” and how it related to the “tragedy.”
Better answers mentioned the distinction between public and private goods, using terms such as rivalrous/nonrivalrous and excludable/nonexcludable. The very best answers also showed consciousness of the difference between “public goods” (that are nonrivalrous, such as a lighthouse or public transportation service), “common goods” (that are rivalrous, such as the park bench or natural resources), and the differences and similarities between the problems that relate to each (collective action problems, free rider problem, tragedy of the commons). These answers also mentioned some of the ways in which authors (Hardin, Olson) recommend addressing these problems and protecting public and common goods (regulation, privatization, selective incentives).
8. How do we judge whether some theories in political science are better than others?
The minimal answer (about C- or 13/20) for this question included at least a reference to all five of the characteristics we discussed in class: generality, accuracy, parsimony, falsifiability, and causality. Additional credit was given for accurate descriptions of each of these (through about B+ or 18/20). The very best answers did a little more than just list these characteristics and their definitions, also mentioning the tradeoff between accuracy and generality, the significance of falsifiability (as opposed to earlier notions of verification), and possibly providing a couple of illustrations.
Part III Essay (70 pts.)
Choose ONE of the following. Remember: Your essay must make an argument by staking out a position and then supporting that position with evidence.
A. Describe the effects of different electoral systems on the outcome of elections. That is, how do the methods we use affect the answers we get? And why is there such a diversity of electoral systems in use around the world?
B. Using what you know of models and theories in political science, design a political science research project to test any of the various theories of any ONE of the following: Marx, Weber, Huntington, Hardin, Duverger. Describe such a project, its structure, its sources of data, and its chief hypothesis.
C. Describe and analyze a real-world collective action problem that we have not discussed during lectures. What allowed the collective action problem to be overcome, or what prevented collective action from occurring?
For the essays, length is not the sole criterion, but in general they should be about 2-3 pages or so of text at a minimum. Foremost was whether the essay answered the question. Then, I was looking for some clarity of argument—a set of coherent points supported with some evidence. Reference to readings was definitely a plus and often was a major part of what distinguished a genuinely “A” answer from the rest.
On essay A, it was vital to realize that there were two parts of the question and to make sure to address each of these. First, you needed to give some general explanation of how electoral systems affect outcomes (many people very thoughtfully framed this in terms of Condorcet, Arrow, the lack of a majority will apart from the institutions used to measure it, etc), and you needed to describe what the effects are of different systems. It was key that you needed to really talk about the EFFECTS of electoral rules. Answers that simply described each system (which you already did for question 5 above) were not awarded nearly as many points. Some of the factors we were looking for included (though not limited to): compromise/inclusiveness, efficiency/effectiveness, accountability, stability, simplicity/tradition, number of parties usually generated, representativeness (of minorities, women, etc), centripitalism/moderation, affects on multi-ethnic populations, how issues get divided amongst parties, preference salience, etc.
For the second question, you had make a theoretical argument as to what accounts for the wide variety of electoral systems that exist internationally. Ideally, your answer to this question was stated as a clear thesis in your introduction and was then either addressed alongside the effects or was handled in the second part of your essay. You needed to demonstrate some knowledge, based on the readings, of why countries might choose or end up with different systems, either based on those systems’ effects (e.g., in cases of ethnically divided societies) or based on history/values. The very best answers addressed the different paths by which electoral systems are created in different states: some by gradual historical evolution or carryover from earlier institutions, some by conscious values- or needs- based choice (where a system was selected to best protect values held by that society or to best handle particular social or demographic tensions). As long as a strong argument was made and backed up by some supporting evidence, however, there was a fair degree of flexibility in acceptable answers (historical path dependency, conscious choice, values, needs of a particular type of society, etc).
Authors that were relevant to this question included: Condorcet, Arrow, Reilly, Norris, Lijphart, Soudriette and Ellis, Burke, Mirabeau, Duverger, North, Rosenfeld, Alesina, …
The very best answers were well structured as responses to both questions, dealt with most of the major systems that we had studied (i.e., plurality, majority, proportional representation, preferential, and possibly the mixed types STV and AV), marshaled the ideas of a number of different authors, referred to at least a few examples of countries to demonstrate points, and made a clear thoughtful argument concerning the origins of variation in system design (not just a quick response in the final paragraph to this part of the question).
Essay B: For this question I wanted to see clear scientific reasoning. You needed to describe clearly what the theoretical model was you planned to test, and then develop an experiment in order to test it. In addition to showing full understanding of the theory being tested, your answer needed to also demonstrate a clear grasp of scientific method and theory judgment criteria. You needed to be conscious of how to apply concepts such as falsifiability and generality to the evaluation of a real theoretical model. (Implicitly, you must show that the theory you intend to test is falsifiable. Also, one clear mistake here was to conceptualize the test as an attempt to “prove” the model correct. This failed to grasp the idea that theories cannot be verified through experimentation, only falsified.)
Best answers laid out a clear neat experimental design, thoughtfully considered the data sources to be used, and correctly identified what hypothesized outcome would correspond with the theory’s predictions and which hypothesized outcome would violate these expectations and falsify the theory. Best answers also generally included some reference to the general principles by which good theories can be judged (discussed in question 8).
Essay C: This essay required that you develop a clear example that demonstrated your comfortable with key concepts from collective action theory and that you can see how these interrelate and apply to real world problems. Your answer had to include: a clear description of the collective action problem at hand, a description of what happened and if the problem was ever overcome, and an explanation for why this was and what factors either allowed or prevented collective action from occurring.
Best answers to this question showed precisely how the problem they had described could be modeled in terms of collective action theory concepts. They clearly identified who the (potential) collective actors were (individuals, groups, countries, etc), what their interests were, and what public or common good was at stake. This last element was particularly relevant, because it requires reframing the “collective action” problem to think “what is in this for everybody?” There are some things that we inherently know are collective action problems, but we do not usually think of in terms of the non-excludable good that they provide. But reframing the question in terms of what the benefit is that all group members can expect (at least in the long term) can help generate a more fruitful analysis of the individual group member’s rational weighting of interests and how that might have led to the particular outcome being explained.
Best answers to this question demonstrated a familiarity with the theoretical explanations for what factors make collective action problems easier or harder to solve. This might include: group size, anonymity versus reputation, values and norms of behavior, individual rationality, free rider and tragedy of the commons problems, levels of social capital (norms of trust and reciprocity in the given group or society, pre-existing networks of relationships), regulation, privatization, and selective incentives. Best answers also referenced some of the literature we have read or discussed on this or closely related and relevant subjects (Olson, Hardin, Putnam, Tocqueville,…) Clear logical argument justifying a plausible causal explanation for the collective action outcome (i.e. success or failure) was also key.
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