As you can see from “A Global Snapshot,” there are about as many electoral systems in existence as there are electors and a state need merely choose which interests or groups to exclude or minimize and which to focus on. It must be understood as stated in the article, the proper system for a group depends on the long history and culture they share, but this fact doesn’t answer the question of which is the best system in general? To me, the best system is the majority system, though it is a matter of utility rather than some notion of justice or fairness.
The majority system avoids the problem of the plurality system whereby the majority of people could have voted against the victorious candidate as we have seen in several US presidential elections, most recently being Bill Clinton in 1992 AND 1996, as well as the current president Bush in 2000. A majority system would seem to increase the effectiveness or properly said the legitimacy of an administration as in order to be in office you need to have a mandate from the people.
It is a relatively simple system, simplicity being crucial to me in the selection of a political system. If a state is going to encourage its populace to vote, and vote voluntarily (Australia are you nuts?) they need to make the system as simple and effective as possible. The majority system would seem to lead to a concentration of power in political parties, perhaps more than plurality as there is at least the viability of a third candidate, but fewer than you would see in preferential or proportional representation. This will create the necessity for internal stability within the party as well as the relative stability of the government as it is not founded on fragile and transient coalitions.
Proportional representation has its merits in that it tries to give more voice to smaller groups, but there is a lot more marginal argument that can undermine the legitimacy of a government. Depending on whether or not you round up or down can determine parliamentary majorities and leads to dissent among the losers. The majority system removes the fringe argument in that there are clearly defined requirements for victory and it can also resist the argument that it ignores the voice of the smaller parties because they are allowed to vote for or against a candidate, though he/she may not be the smaller groups’ ideal choice.
Preferential voting is getting into the realm of being very complicated for the voter. The simplicity of any of the previous systems begins to fall away with this system in that you are imposing artificial mathematical restrictions on voting. This is as opposed to very easily understood concepts like the most votes wins, the person with 50%+1 wins or 40% of the vote corresponds to roughly 40% of the seats. The main criticism I have is that Preferential voting quickly becomes arbitrary. Imagine again the lunacy of the Australian ballot or look at last year with the GUSA presidential elections when it was shown that the order of the candidates on the ballot influenced their proportion of the vote. There is a certain tolerance threshold people have for candidates. It ranges from 1 to an infinite number of people that the populace can actually know, or frankly care about. Asking them to vote on a multitude of candidates is asking too much.
Majority voting is by no means the ideal system, but it leads to an ultimately stable government.
Wednesday, October 1, 2008
Blog Post #1
Lijphart outlines the possible electoral systems as Plurality and Proportional Representation, and the possible governmental structures as Parliamentary and Presidential. Describing the underlying motivation behind choosing a particular electoral system, he links proportional representation with a coalition government as part of a multi-party system (Reilly calls this “centripetal” government), while he suggests plurality creates two-party systems with a dominant one-party cabinet and executive. Lijphart notes that presidentialism fosters competition for one office that only the largest parties have the means to compete for. This breeds a culture of two-party politics and the marginalization of fringe parties.
The United States has a pluralistic voting system and a Presidential government. According to the readings from this week, this makes our system far less representative than others around the world. We place our faith in one powerful executive who can singlehandedly override the will of congress, but who must be overridden by 2/3 of the legislative body to be checked. This executive is chosen by an electorate presented with a choice between two individuals. In our pluralistic society we must choose the candidate who is aligned with more of our own interests than the other. Our expression of preference is limited to supporting the candidate who agrees with us more often.
Expressed in these institutions are certain values held by the authors of our system. Our pluralistic voting method demonstrates that we aren’t concerned with reflecting our societal preferences in government as a whole; only the majority’s preferences matter. Our Presidential system speaks to our desire to have an executive who can act quickly and decisively to solve crises in a way that a representative legislative body cannot. As we are witnessing with the financial crisis however, such action is limited to specific areas such as defense and disaster relief. This would suggest that as a public we value decisive, unilateral response over the proportionality of our representation in government. Both of these institutions give rise to the two-party system. Pluralistic elections necessitate a clear definitive choice and Presidential government requires parties that are broad in ideology that encompass enough of the electorate to win a majority of votes. If there is a third party it is bound to overlap with another and neither would be effective.
I think a lot of the dissatisfaction with the political process in this country stems from the two-party system and the concept of majority rule that accompanies it. Politicians need only conform to 50% + 1 of the population’s demands. Based on the readings, it seems plausible to suggest that the electoral and governmental institutions we have chosen have created this divided climate and by comparison makes the arguments expressed in Ben Reilly’s article about how proportional representation inspires consensus and compromise seem even more valid. There is a lot to be said for our system of government but by limiting our preferences to a choice between two parties we have limited our ability to carry out the will of the country as a whole.
Response 1
Examining the different forms of electoral systems throughout the world, I believe, provides a significant insight to the struggle of new democratizing nations to develop fair, functioning democracies. I largely agree with both Lijphart and Reilly that when dealing with a newly beginning, and more importantly ethnically fissured, democracy the plurality system that we swear by in our American elections is simply too dangerous an option. Both agree that in an ethnically fractured society the need for a minority voice within domestic government overcomes the need for a single party term that can make fast, decisive, but accountable choices. In the US, these plurality system values are concordant and even helpful to our current political status, as although we are very far from being perfect, we have been able to create parties that are not solely tied to an ethnic base. In many new developing nations that hearken back to a strong tribal system of government, voting outside of one’s ethnic group seems wholly inconceivable. With either a plurality system or a preferential system, voters can feel their vote is not wasted, and they will have the opportunity to be represented in their new democracies, encouraging participation and confidence in government. Additionally, as a world superpower, the US is forced to make expedient security and defense decisions, and it is crucial that the players in office are (at least theoretically) held accountable for these decisions. However, in developing nations, where democracy is both a very new system of government but also a new way of thinking of how people are governed, the primary focus is not making expedient decisions from outside pressures, but controlling some of the most detrimental domestic problems of nations, such as ethnic violence, systemic corruption, and majority oppression. This creates a value shift away from the need for strong, accountable manufactured majorities, to a need for varied, representative governments such as PR systems or preferential voting systems.
Blog #1: Electoral Systems
The readings this week focus on the electoral systems in affect in many independent states in the world. Although in my opinion, I believe that manhy of these readings were very repetitive and could stop you form getting the gist are argument of the readings. But my job is not to critique the “value” of these readings, so……
One topic that I would like to address is which institution of electoral systems should eb used and will be more affective in developing or developed countries. One thing that King has asserted in lecture is that the Institutions create incentive structures for individuals to behave in particular ways. So in other words, the electoral systems will almost create a specific outcome in that state. Lijhart asserts that parliamentarism with proportionalism representation should be used in democratic countries. In my opinion, Benjamin Rielly did a better job of presenting Lijhart’s argument for the use of parliamentarism with proportionalism. Rielly says Lijhart and other scholars believe that proportionalism is more effective because in divided states( which is the case for many developed countries) it will encourage incentives for the politicians to reach out of their ethnic group. He also says that proportionalism will create an arena of bargaining so politicians of different background will come together and this will create a better range of public policies for the voter.
In agreement with Reilly. I do not believe that proportionalism is always the solution for all Divided States. Although it creates incentive structures for individuals to behave in particular ways, people might not always take these incentives. What if politicians do not take advantage of the arena of bargaining. What if the people do not wish to become and undivided state? In some cases, we see where the people refuse to come together to find common ground. In my opinion, proportionalism is not need to help create a steady structure in divided societies. Like America, our presidential election is not proportional and because we as a nation wish for commonality among all people; we have interracial, interethnic, and mixed gender presidential and vice presidential candidates.
One topic that I would like to address is which institution of electoral systems should eb used and will be more affective in developing or developed countries. One thing that King has asserted in lecture is that the Institutions create incentive structures for individuals to behave in particular ways. So in other words, the electoral systems will almost create a specific outcome in that state. Lijhart asserts that parliamentarism with proportionalism representation should be used in democratic countries. In my opinion, Benjamin Rielly did a better job of presenting Lijhart’s argument for the use of parliamentarism with proportionalism. Rielly says Lijhart and other scholars believe that proportionalism is more effective because in divided states( which is the case for many developed countries) it will encourage incentives for the politicians to reach out of their ethnic group. He also says that proportionalism will create an arena of bargaining so politicians of different background will come together and this will create a better range of public policies for the voter.
In agreement with Reilly. I do not believe that proportionalism is always the solution for all Divided States. Although it creates incentive structures for individuals to behave in particular ways, people might not always take these incentives. What if politicians do not take advantage of the arena of bargaining. What if the people do not wish to become and undivided state? In some cases, we see where the people refuse to come together to find common ground. In my opinion, proportionalism is not need to help create a steady structure in divided societies. Like America, our presidential election is not proportional and because we as a nation wish for commonality among all people; we have interracial, interethnic, and mixed gender presidential and vice presidential candidates.
Tuesday, September 30, 2008
Response #1: Electoral System for the U.S.A.
All of the readings for this week provide detailed descriptions of various forms of electoral systems that exist and what kind of system best accommodates a given type of polity. One topic of discussion that I wish to present, one that should be of much interest to most of us and of some value for our study of electoral systems is the ideal electoral system for the U.S.A. Given the scope of this blog, I would like to limit the discussion to our method of electing congressmen.
In determining what kind of electoral system best suits the U.S.A., we should begin with an examination of what we value. Arend Lijphart notes that there is no dispute between PR and pluarlity advocates on the question of "the respective effects of the two electoral methods," but they do disagree on "the weight attached to these effects" (259). Our congressmen are elected using the pluarlity system. The effect is well-known: two parties dominate our government. The advocates for this system claim that "only in two-party systems can clear accountability for government policy be achieved" (259). The results of the 2006 U.S. Congressional elections can be seen to show that disenchanted citizens can punish a political party that demonstrates poor performance. If that claim is true, then we should ask ourselves whether we value greater proportional (minority) representation or our ability to hold our government accountable.
The U.S.A. is indeed a pluralistic society. People from all sorts of background with diverse interests coexist in this nation. It seems somewhat backward, then, that our government reflects only the interests of a simple majority of people, assuming that the malpractice of gerrymandering is perfectly balanced between the Democrats and Republicans. Women make up the biggest minority group, in terms of political representation, in the U.S.A. The table on page 261 shows that women's representation is significantly lower in plurality systems than in PR systems. Perhaps that can explain why NOW (National Organization of Women) and their cause for the constitutional ERA (Equal Rights Amendment) have not been as successful as one would expect in such a stable democracy as the U.S..
Moreover, Lijphart shows that PR systems in general do not underperform their Pluarlity counterparts. The figures in Table 2, page 262 present favorable data for PR systems in both Economic Growth and Unemployment rates.
While these figures do favor the PR system, advocates of Plurality systems still have a claim on government accountability. The example of U.S. Congress 2006 elections seems to support this claim. But the figures in Table 1 for "Voting Turnout" seem to cast doubt on the validity of the claim. While the specific example may be effective for advocates of Pluarlity systems, a voting turnout of 54.2% hardly demonstrates active voter participation to hold the government accountable. The 84.5% voting turnout of PR systems suggests that voters are more willing to express their dissatisfaction/satisfaction toward the government when they feel that their votes actually count, made possible through the PR system. I conclude that the PR system is most appropriate for electing U.S. Congressmen.
In determining what kind of electoral system best suits the U.S.A., we should begin with an examination of what we value. Arend Lijphart notes that there is no dispute between PR and pluarlity advocates on the question of "the respective effects of the two electoral methods," but they do disagree on "the weight attached to these effects" (259). Our congressmen are elected using the pluarlity system. The effect is well-known: two parties dominate our government. The advocates for this system claim that "only in two-party systems can clear accountability for government policy be achieved" (259). The results of the 2006 U.S. Congressional elections can be seen to show that disenchanted citizens can punish a political party that demonstrates poor performance. If that claim is true, then we should ask ourselves whether we value greater proportional (minority) representation or our ability to hold our government accountable.
The U.S.A. is indeed a pluralistic society. People from all sorts of background with diverse interests coexist in this nation. It seems somewhat backward, then, that our government reflects only the interests of a simple majority of people, assuming that the malpractice of gerrymandering is perfectly balanced between the Democrats and Republicans. Women make up the biggest minority group, in terms of political representation, in the U.S.A. The table on page 261 shows that women's representation is significantly lower in plurality systems than in PR systems. Perhaps that can explain why NOW (National Organization of Women) and their cause for the constitutional ERA (Equal Rights Amendment) have not been as successful as one would expect in such a stable democracy as the U.S..
Moreover, Lijphart shows that PR systems in general do not underperform their Pluarlity counterparts. The figures in Table 2, page 262 present favorable data for PR systems in both Economic Growth and Unemployment rates.
While these figures do favor the PR system, advocates of Plurality systems still have a claim on government accountability. The example of U.S. Congress 2006 elections seems to support this claim. But the figures in Table 1 for "Voting Turnout" seem to cast doubt on the validity of the claim. While the specific example may be effective for advocates of Pluarlity systems, a voting turnout of 54.2% hardly demonstrates active voter participation to hold the government accountable. The 84.5% voting turnout of PR systems suggests that voters are more willing to express their dissatisfaction/satisfaction toward the government when they feel that their votes actually count, made possible through the PR system. I conclude that the PR system is most appropriate for electing U.S. Congressmen.
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