Response #2, Zachary Barbiasz

Now that we have spent a whole semester comparing many different political systems it is easy to see how the many complexities involved with politics makes it difficult to understand why certain states function as they do. During the semester we studied numerous theories in order to understand why so many different systems have developed and how they function today. By doing so, we learned how the effects of globalization, democratization, modernization, capitalism, and ethnicity, etc., have contributed to the development of different political systems.
Starting with the satellite nations of the Soviet Union that developed as a result of the Cold War, we can see how the issue of ethnicity has led to territorial problems. In many cases the rapid development of these nations resulted in instabilities especially when ethnic diversity was added to the mix. With this said, the violence that resulted from the development of these nations has caused their systems of government to fail over and over. Even in the satellite nations that have democratized to the point of electing officials, many of the elections are still rigged leaving many nations as illiberal democracies.
Aside from the many Eastern European nations who have failed to fully democratize nations such as China and Russia have also remained non-democratic. Some have argued that Russia has moved further ahead of China when it comes to democratization however it is clear that both nations are reluctant to fully democratize. One of the main reasons for this reluctance is the state power that communism enables. With this, the fact that both China and Russia have remained both powerful and communist makes it hard to believe that either nation truly wishes to forgo their communist systems. China and Russia alike are nations with large geographical boundaries which may be one reason why the leaders these nations insist on state control. Along with this, with such high populations, especially in China, the potential for a governmental overthrow is highly feared. As a result, the implementation of fear by the state has been a way for these nations to prevent such uprisings.
When looking at these two instances of failed economic development we can see how many different factors contribute to the ideologies behind these nations systems. In the case of the slowly democratizing satellite nations one reason for the failure to fully democratize has been a product of the people and ethnic ties. In the case of China and Russia, failure to democratize is not so much a result of its people but rather the state.

Violent Past; Shady Present

I feel that violence has been an inherent facet of Islam since the religion’s very inception. The Arab world at the time of Muhammad’s hermitic revelations comprised a series of tribal entities that very often fought for power. Elections were unheard of, and violence was the primary tool used to obtain and maintain power which was centered in the Muslim holy land of Mecca.

Muhammad himself was banished to Medina along with his followers by the tribal family who held power at the time because they felt threatened by this up and coming movement. Unsurprisingly, Muhammad’s “Islam” gained quite a following during his exile, and he later returned with all of his followers to wage war (okay maybe that’s an overstatement, but there was violence is my point) to reclaim Mecca. After Muhammad, a series of power struggles most often ultimately decided by bloodshed (assassination, violent disputes etc.) determined who would next be in charge. When Islam began grounding itself throughout the society such that unification became possible, Islamic empires such as the Umayyad and the Abbasid rose to conquer their vast territories.

That’s not to say other religions are historically clean of violence. However, the head figures of religions such as Christianity and Buddhism did not lead followers to conquer holy lands. In terms of Christianity, violent struggles for power were mostly unheard of. Certainly, rather un-Christian power struggles between popes and kings occurred, and by the time of Charlemagne and after his three-way division of his empire, political backstabbing (literal and figurative) became far more commonplace. Then, of course, there were the Crusades.

It was through such desires for political stature and might that religions began losing sight of the messages they taught (well, as far as I know Buddhism never really did ß-digression). I wish I were more fluent in Islam’s teachings so I could speak more clearly on the issue of whether the religion itself can possibly lead to a sustainable liberal-democratic style of governing. Wittes believes we should take into account three issues: how fairly Muslims believe minorities and women should be treated (in light of the fact that Islam apparently does not feel them deserving of equal rights), how open to pluralism a Muslim government would be, and whether or not the religious branch would “veto power over the democratic process” (Wittes 10).

One important question regarding this topic that Wittes asks is: “If language is often vague and behavior often contradictory, how does one know whether apparent moderation is real?” (Wittes 10-11). Considering this sort of strategic ambiguity and taking into account the violently turbulent roots of the Muslim world and Islam leaves me feeling somewhat suspicious. Additionally, Wittes notes the lack of political freedom in these societies which leaves the Muslim party with no real incentive to discuss its political ideologies. After all, political ideology only shines when a party has to stick to and defend it against an opposing party that threatens to bring to power its own ideology.

Why should language be vague unless its user is hiding something? I am not one for discrimination, but I do support full openness and honesty, for only through these can any two conscious entities—be they small as people or as large as nations—come to a trusting relationship between each other.

Submission #2: Civil Society in Developing Nations

In “Ethnicity and Development in Africa: A Reappraisal” Robert Gates creates a picture of the development of civil society in Africa and its influence on economic stability and development. His insight into a small town in Zambia provides a useful rival alternative to traditional western civil society.

Whereas in western industrialized countries, civil society is much more focused on external connections, be it the Boy Scouts or Rotary Club, connections based on interactions within the community. This is in stark contrast to Gates example where there is a much stronger focus on family and its interaction in the community and society. Although it is different, it is not to say less successful on a micro level, and in fact elicits some of the same benefits. Traditional Civil society is good for incubating positive social relations and improvements in all facets of life. Likewise, in the African village, the connections are overall beneficial since an investment in the children is shown to yield positive returns for the family. This arrangement seems likely to continue as long as it is a wise investment, just as community groups in the West function as long as they continue to achieve their goals.

Similar to western civil society, there are ways of coercing behavior through various sanctions to maintain cohesion. In western society, there are things such as membership dues and fines for bad conduct that help to maintain the proper environment for functioning civil society just as in the African town, the social pressures exerted by the middle age generation help to keep the youth in line, for there is a price to pay for the valuable education they are receiving. In both cases, this social pressure helps maintain a successful system.

The important thing to realize is that although they are different, both systems seem to fit the situation and achieve the goal of strong social bonds and civil society.

Response #2

Throughout Robyn Meredith’s The Elephant and the Dragon, there are multiple references to the rising Tata Group of India. A few months ago, in the mist of the U.S. economic strife, I remember reading a New York Times article “New Life for Jaguar Under Tata Motors” on the purchase of Jaguar Cars Ltd. by Tata Motors, part of the Tata Group, from Ford Motor Company.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/04/automobiles/04TATA.html

Tata Motors has clearly grown to challenge the stronghold US companies have on not only the luxury car industry but the fuel efficient, economic car market as well. Tata motors “recently created a stir by introducing a new car for India, the Nano, which costs just $2,500”. Tata Motors is only one fraction of the Tata conglomerate whose dominion is diverse and far reaching including steel, tea, watches, and publishing (New Life for Jaguar). I could not think of one US industry whose reach is as diverse as that of the Tata Group.

Rereading the New York Times article after having read Robyn Meredith’s book, it reinforced Meredith’s point of India’s rising status. Recent developments in the Tata-Ford deal has shown that India's dependence on the US economy has lead to an instability within the country. The recent strain on the three car giants-GM, Ford, and Chrysler-has affected Tata Motors as well. As a result, some of the Tata Motor plants have already ceased production (Motor Industry Caught in Eye of Storm) http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/motors/2008/1119/1227026408003.html

The Tata-Ford deal defies some of the assumed results of India’s rise. Meredith focuses a great deal on “offshoring,” or the transfer of jobs from one country to another. Offshoring seems to be a probable outcome of the Tata-Ford deal, yet “Tata has pledged to retain most of the companies employees and managers” (New Life for Jaguar). This serves as a reassurance for the US's ailing workforce.

Globalization, Globalism, and Globality

During lecture this week, professor King pointed out the difficulty of defining the commonly used word, "globalization". The overuse of this word in perhaps too many contexts without careful discrimination has virtually made this word devoid of any meaning--or perhaps rendered the word to mean anything. I hope to provide a useful set of definitions that might clear up the confusion regarding the word.

In Globalization of the "A Very Short Introduction" series (British Politics, you will remember, is also of the series), Manfred B. Steger attempts to define this multifaceted and multidimensional term. Steger, while acknowledging that "there exists no scholarly consensus" on the essence of globalization, outlines the "thematic overlap in various scholarly attempts" to define this term (Steger 9).

1. "Globalization involves the creation of new and the multiplication of existing social networks and activities that increasingly overcome traditional political, economic, cultural, and geographical boundaries."
2. "The second quality of globalization is reflected in the expansion and the stretching of social relations, activities, and interdependencies."
3. "Third, globalization involves the intensification and acceleration of social exchanges and activities."
4. Finally, globalization "[fosters] in people a growing awarenss of deepening connections between the local and the distant."
(9-13)

While this quick outline does not do justice to Steger's systematic attempt to define the term, one thing we should note is the fact that globalization refers to a set of processes, and shouldn't be confused with the terms globalism and globality.

Globalism: "an ideology that endows the concept of globalization with neoliberal values and meanings" (94)
Globality: "[signifies] a social condition characterized by the existence of global economic, political, cultural, and environmental interconnections and flows that make many of the currently existing borders and boundaries irrelevant." (7)

To sum it up, globalization is a SET OF PROCESSES, globalism is AN IDEOLOGY, and globality is a CONDITION. Steger's criticisms against the ideology of globalism is as follows:

1. Oversimplification of the term globalization by equating the multidimensional set of processes as a mere global integration of markets.
2. The idea that globalization is inevitable and irreversable: a teleological perspective.
3. The view that nobody but the 'invisible hand' and technology are responsible for globalization (and its negative effects), thereby demobilizing antiglobalist movements.
4. The view that globalization benefits everyone.

With these terms defined, I think an interesting discussion can follow regarding where Meredith stands. Can Meredith be accused of espousing globalism, the ideology? There is a good argument to be made for the affirmative, but I would say no. While her book heavily emphasizes the economic developments of India and China, i.e. the economic dimension of globalism, she is not writing on globalization per se, nor does she claim to do so. Second, she posits the future of the two countries' economies as more integrated and open, but she balances it with the prospects of political obstacles that may hinder this development. It may be somewhat more difficult to free Meredith from Steger's third criticism. Meredith's book gives the impression that the culprit behind the job destruction in the U.S. and low wages for Chinese factory workers is none other than the 'invisible hand', market forces over which individuals have no control. But maybe that is simply true, and we shouldn't be in the business of pointing fingers at economic participants; perhaps we should seek to remedy these negative effects through channels such as improving education in the U.S. Finally, Meredith balances the good effects of the economic dimension of globalization (e.g. creation of jobs, higher standards of living) with the bad effects (e.g. job losses, environmental issues).

Reflections on Development Lectures and Economics of Transition Economies

First off, it may seem like a trivial distinction, but inefficiencies and lack of innovation incentives of SOEs did not result from a lack of competition, per se, as was brought up in today's lecture. In fact, we see many monopolies in industrialized, market-based economies that try to cut costs wherever possible because they reap the rewards of increasing profit. SOEs, on the other hand, did not stand to benefit from cost-cutting technological innovation and, therefore, lacked innovation incentives.

More broadly, I think there is a Part B, so to speak, that was omitted from the discussion of the development of development economics. This part of the story begins with the fact that beginning in the mid to early 1970s, the development communities in South Asia, Africa and Latin America built the required infrastructure, taught the technicians, assisted the economists and ministers, and so on. In other words, everything you would think needed to be done....was done. A skeptic might ask, "Where are these roads and bridges you speak of? And why aren't the governments filled with competent leaders?" The short answer is that the runways are right where they were left...they just happen to under about a foot of dirt; and the experts are there, too...they're just not in office. The more serious answer is that the sort of programs and projects completed by development teams is the sort that requires a great degree of maintenance, and maintence requires a great degree of funding. Despite all that the development community has done to help alleviate poverty, the amount of funding that most of these countries receive as a percentage of their GDP is quite small; in the case of India, it's almost neglible. In other words, the development community faces strictly binding funding constraints that make it impossible to both buid everything AND maintain it. That being said, the definition of development surely has to at least include a sustainability component, after all, how can a country temporarily succeed in development? Eventually, the development community realized that the lack of maintanence stemmed from a lack of a feeling of ownership or agency; those projects that tended to benefit from upkeep were those that were at least partially envisioned and championed by the recipient country. Therefore, the progression within the field of development in recent years has been to hand over the reigns to the country receiving assistance since a project can only be successful if it is given long-term maintanence funding, which happens over the long-run only with those projects that are internally deemed to be of great import (which isn't to say that delegates of the Washington Consensus don't try to plead their case). In practice, development of this sort turns out largely to be on a project by project basis; when a country or community asks for assisstance in building a well, let's say, the success of the project is based on how the well serves the community as opposed to its projected effect on long-term income growth. It is for this reason that I was disappointed to hear Professor King belittle the good the comes from particular projects and programs. The development of development economics has shown these sorts of programs, provided they are supported by the recipient country, are really the only avenue available to outsiders who want to help alleviate suffering around the world. The grandiose, macro-level projects that King claimed define the true field of development (taking a page out of the Palin book of "real" dichotomies) have not been successful over the long-run. To summarize, only those projects, programs or policies that are embraced/championed/envisioned by the recipient country stand a chance of producing sustainable development improvements.

Finally, I'd like to bring up an article titled "Institution Building and Growth in Transition Economies" (Beck and Laeven 2006) that seeks to explain the divergence in GDP growth between Central and Eastern European countries and former Soviet Union countries in terms of institutional development, which itself is a function of the entrenchment of elites and the richness of natural resources. This article is particularly relevant since its causality differs from Lipset: political and geographic factors --> institutional development --> economic growth. The intuition being that socialist elites who had been in office a long time in countries rich with natural resources were out to capture rents instead of being fully committed to building strong, market-based/compatible institutions.

Response Two

Through her book, Meredith does a good job in opening the discussion of the basic ethical arguments for and against free trade with China and India. It can be hard to ignore the fact that workers in India and China who are becoming increasingly employed by foreign firms (often times American firms) are getting paid only a small fraction of the money that a worker in the United States would make for doing the same job. It then can seem on the surface to be one of the great ethical debates in free trade whether foreign companies are truly helping domestic workers by providing jobs, or simply exploiting them to receive higher cooperate profits. Is it a situation of the very rich get richer and the poor stay poor? However, Meredith rightly argues that in a situation of comparative advantage both countries receive long-term gains. In basic economic theory, the principle of comparative advantage shows that free trade between countries that have a comparative advantage in different goods will actually increase the welfare for both countries. Labor abundant countries, for example, can produce labor-intensive goods relatively more efficiently than capital abundant countries can produce those same goods. This in turn leaves each country room to specialize in the goods which they are relatively better at producing (like manufacturing jobs in china and high technology innovation in the United States.) Increased efficiency in the markets will lead to lower prices and a high quantity that both countries can consume, effectively increasing welfare in both countries. Foreign workers that are receiving a small fraction of what the same work would be paid for in the United States are increasing welfare not because they are equally as well off as a worker is in the United States, but they are relatively more well off than they were before. To the question of if it is ethical to pay a worker two or three dollars a day to work in a clothing factory, one must ask first if the worker is better off now than he was in autarky with no trade making less than a dollar a day.

Blog 11/12

I found Mary Gallagher’s article to have great deal of fascinating information regarding the structure of the Chinese economy. In particular, I found her comparison of the Chinese economic path and the quite disparate road to economic success taken by Taiwan and Korea to be very interesting. As Gallagher demonstrates, Foreign Investment has brought China to prominence, but the path taken by Taiwan and Korea focused on domestic business and growth stimulated from within the country. In those countries the shift from socialism involved close cooperation between the state and entrepreneurs to ensure that the country’s people benefitted. As Gallagher describes, this led to widespread independent business interests whose mere existence began to cause authoritarian regimes to be “untenable”. China’s system was far different. Because the capital to create economic growth was coming from private interests outside the country, entrepreneurship in China didn’t develop as it did in its East Asian neighbors.  As far as the Chinese Government is concerned this works perfectly. There is a great deal of economic development and the society benefits because there are lots of jobs to be had. Citizens in China have access to jobs, but not ownership in businesses that are driving the economic progress in that country. As such there isn’t the same conflict between private business interest and state control. China has brought itself economic progress while managing to delay its political progression toward democracy. It could be argued that this has been done at the expense of its citizens, since foreign nations are benefitting from the investments they make in China, rather than the citizens benefitting from the private markets in their own country as is the case in Taiwan and Korea.

China's FDI liberalization and Taiwan's autonomy/sovereignty

Gallagher's article was not about Taiwan's international status, but this topic was touched upon several times this week during the lectures so I thought that discussing it in the context of China's economic liberalization would be of some interest for our section. Really the issue of Taiwan independence is an extremely sensitive issue and I was appalled to see during my International Finance class this morning that Taiwan was listed as a province of China (we were looking at graphs of U.S. current accounts with various countries in the world).

After China opened up its economy for FDI, it has surprisingly found a very willing provider of capital in its small island neighbor of Taiwan. Since Deng Xiaoping's reforms, the economic ties between Taiwan and Mainland China has been growing unaffected by the volatile political relations between the two. Taiwan's FDI in China completely dwarfs Taiwan's FDI in any other place in the world. In 2003, there were 3,875 instances of Taiwanese FDI in Mainland China (highest) as opposed 229 in the USA (second highest). This has worried some observers who believe that as Taiwanese capitalists accumulate vested interests in Mainland China, they will favor policies of the PRC such as reunification, and oppose destabilizing policies like independence. These businessmen will try to create friendly ties with the PRC, which is ultimately focused on reunifying Taiwan on its own terms.

In addition to Taiwanese FDI to China, Taiwanese dependence on the Mainland as a market for exports has greatly increased over the years since the PRC's economic reforms. In 1998 the Taiwan's total exports to China was about 17.7% of its total exports, and in 2003, this number increased to 24.2%. This has also created security concerns for Taiwan because the exporting party is always more dependent on the importer, rather than vice versa. This has raised the possibility of China coercing Taiwan economically to negotiate reunification on China's terms, and Taiwan having to submit because of its growing economic dependence on the Mainland.

Some observers maintain that growing economic ties will not put Taiwan in an unfavorable position in cross-strait negotiations, because both parties are interdependent and stability in the Taiwan strait will remain the highest priority for economic concerns. It may be the case that the asymmetry of Taiwanese economic dependence on China is exaggerated, and that China has no interest trying to use it as leverage in cross-strait negotiations. Really what I hoped to achieve through this post to was provide a Taiwanese perspective on the implications of China's economic reforms, since our readings provide the Mainland's perspective.



Statistics taken from Presidential Politics in Taiwan: the Administration of Chen Shuibian edited by Steven M. Goldstein & Julian Chang.

Response 2

I found Meredith's arguments about the differences between China's economic growth and India's economic growth very interesting. We've talked about the relationship between economic reform and the political system of a state, and I think the Chinese and Indian examples might help us define what this relationship is. It seems that Meredith is arguing in the chapter "The Spinning Wheel to the Fiber-Optic Wire" that India's democracy has in fact hindered its economic growth, whereas the Chinese pseudo-communist system (or "state-capitalism" as it is described by one analyst Meredith mentions) has been one of the major factors that has contributed to China's rapid growth. I found one point particularly interesting, that is that Indian politicians are accountable to the their citizens, and in order to be reelected they cannot enact the pro-business policies that would lead to the buildup of India's infrastructure, which would lead to the growth of its economies. In China, the Communist Party has made a point to make economic reforms before political reforms, which means that the party controls all aspects of the economy, virtually destroying any opposition to its policies. 

Whereas Meredith does not seem to take a stance on whether she believes the Indian model is preferable to the Chinese model, Buruma argues strongly in his article "What Beijing Can Learn from Moscow" that the Chinese model is the wrong way to go about gradual democratization. Whereas Gorbachev enacted an abrupt overhaul of the political system in Russia, enabling its citizens to openly speak out against the state in order to undermine the Communist regime, China has decided to have a firm hand over its citizens, not allowing any kind of political dissent, evidenced by the surpession of protests and demonstrations. The Chinese believe that the old Communist system of the 20th century is outdated and that change is needed, but it must be a gradual, controlled change. Buruma's fear is that the Chinese people, without an outlet to express their frustrations with the state, will eventually "explode one day." 

So what is the preferred system? Is it that of India, China, or Russia? It seems that there are advantages and pitfalls to each system. India, though a democracy with rights for its citizens, has had hampered economic growth, for primarily those reasons. In the Chinese model, there is massive economic growth, but its citizens do not enjoy the same rights that the Indians do. And it appears that the Russian system, because of its abrupt dissolution and transformation into a democracy, is rather unstable. Perhaps it is my Western bias, but I like the Indian model because it's liberal democratic policies allow for the flourishing of ideas and the chance of great innovation. A country with over a billion people with the potential for that kind of innovation is staggering. In each case, however, it seems these countries have to shake off the vestiges of their historical precedents, whether it be China and Russia's communism or India's socialism, in order to become true capitalist economies and liberal democratic political systems

-Patrick Foust

Response #2: "Reform and Openness"（改革开放）

At the beginning of the semester, Professor King identified performance as a method by which a state can claim legitimacy, in addition to the more traditionally recognized methods. I remember thinking of China as soon as we were discussing this method of legitimation. Although China's CCP lacked the rational/legal method of claiming legitimacy, and it can be argued that the CCP largely lost its charismatic leadership after the death of Mao Zedong, the process of democratization did not occur because the CCP's performance in saving/reforming China's economy has really solidified its claim to legitimacy.

Gallagher points out that the economic reforms and their success has "[bought] the existing regime time to implement politically difficult reforms and to reformulate the ideological foundation of their legitimacy to rule" (372). Since the end of Mao's rule, the CCP has been suffering from a legitimacy deficit. The death of the charismatic leader forced the party to seek ways in which it can consolidate its rule over China, and I believe it has relied on its performance to achieve this. Examples can be the CCP's successful economic policies, successful deterrence of Taiwan from declaring independence, and its successful hosting of the 2008 Beijing Olympics (not to mention that China's "performance" was stellar in the games).

While the argument Gallagher makes is convincing, I challenge her qualification of the general argument that the role of FDI in China's economic reforms "has led to a delay in political change" rather than stopping it altogether (371). I would like to propose at least the possibility of the CCP managing to permanently hold its power and legitimacy in mainland China. Whether this view will hold true is for the future to tell, but we should remain open to this possibility and avoid the democracy-biased view of the transition paradigm theorists, as Carothers would argue. Perhaps the somewhat unconventional coexistance of a capitalist economy (though it is not complete) and authoritarian rule in Mainland China will prove to be viable and stable in the long run.

Why Competition Can Poisonous to the Authoritarian Model

I would like to begin by briefly fleshing out what I take to be the central components of the ‘fragmentation argument’, and then proceed to argue that a far-sided application of Gallagher’s argument is compatible with the Lipset thesis.

This article is primarily intended to preserve the Lipset thesis, which holds that there is a causal flow from economic reform and liberalization to democratization, by explaining how the Chinese model falls outside the parameters of this thesis. Gallagher’s explanation begins by pointing out that the thrust of the reforms under Deng in the mid 70s were designed to bring in more FDI. The success of these reforms throughout the 80s and early 90s caused competition on three levels: 1) SOEs competed between each other for foreign investment and against foreign-financed firms 2) regions competed with each other in an effort to attract more FDI and 3) workers competed against each other for jobs. According to Gallagher, all of this competition dissolves the chance of there being a unified opposition movement since each group is too preoccupied with getting a bigger piece of the investment pie, so to speak.

Not surprisingly, the political reforms that have been achieved have largely been motivated by a desire to put in place those conditions necessary to attract more investment such as clear property rights and a strong legal and judicial system. A major challenge to the Chinese project of political reform is that democratization, per se, does not necessarily attract more investment. In fact, businesses are more concerned with institutional stability and consistency, a characteristic that provides them with the ability to appropriately adjust their expectations of future conditions. Democratization, on the other hand, is a messy process that typically requires a good deal of time before accomplishing any semblance of stability. Seen in this light, it appears as though the Chinese incentive structure for political reform is too weak and is dominated by the short-term gains from maintaining the status quo. However, I believe that the Lipset thesis is ultimately more robust and that the Chinese focus on FDI need not mark the end of opportunities to reform.

What serves as the most promising sign of Chinese political reform is the most discouraging result of its recent economic growth. Although foreign investment has done wonders to China’s per capita GDP, its effect on median income has been nearly negligible. Competing against fellow country men is all well and good when it’s a matter of who is going to win more than the other; however, when one group begins to consistently win at the expense of the others, the character of interest group politics changes to one of hostility and perceived oppression. In conclusion, the gains from FDI certainly ushered in a new era of competition in China that did away with the socialist model; but the skewed distribution of the gains might well serve as the impetus for political change.

Response 2

In reading Mary Gallagher’s article on the lagging process of democratization in China despite the growth of capitalism and market principles, I was struck by the extent to which the Communist Party in China has actually abandoned many of the traditionally socialist values in order to make way for market principles. As Gallagher traces the history of Foreign Direct Investment in China, we see that the various regions and private enterprises of China have embraced competition as a necessary element of the modern economy in order to make China, its labor, and its skilled workers competitive. Furthermore, as China continues to develop, the general failure of state-owned organizations (Gallagher notes that almost half were losing money in the 1990s, and that while they are only responsible for about 30% of the country’s industrial growth they consume 70% of its loans) only points to the likelihood of an increase in the use of market principles in China’s future (Gallagher 352).
Yet the Communist Party has brilliantly reformulated itself as a party of national interest rather than economic or class interest. Gallagher notes that even though the ruling Communist regime has increasingly embraced capitalist principles, the change is “framed as being in the national interest and as essential for national economic survival in an increasing globalized economy” (345). In light of this, I think that the modern Chinese Communist Party is best labeled as an authoritarian party that relies on nationalism and a thriving economy to support its platform rather than any fixed ideological principles. As long as people are willing to tolerate this regime for the benefit of the performance of the nation as a whole, China will remain the exception to the theories first started by Lipset about ties between economic and political change.
However, even though Gallagher’s article emphasizes China’s exception to these paradigms, she herself can’t overlook the fact that legal institutions are growing, albeit only to mediate economic conflicts. She also notes that as incomes grow, citizens are gaining access to lawyers and a greater consciousness about civil and political rights (Gallagher 371). It will be interesting to see how much further the “Communist” party is willing to adapt and change as these institutions become more entrenched through China’s increased contact with the global market. Though it is certainly a strong and unified party, the extent to which it is able to dictate its future versus the extent to which it must adapt should itself be a marker of the progress China is making, even if the party itself has not been ousted from power in the traditional democratizing pattern we have seen elsewhere in the world.

Response #1

Pierre Hassner’s article “Russia’s Transition to Autocracy,” alluded to a previous week’s reading Seymour Lipset’s “Economic Development and Democracy.” At first read, I saw no correlation between Lipset’s ideology and Hassner’s article. And although Hassner praised Lipset’s academic research, after reading his article, I came to the conclusion that Russia’s current state contradicts Lipset’s belief that economic development and urbanization lead to democratic values in a society. His mandates are still part of palimentary and electoral procedures, yet they are completely lacking of constitutional liberalism. Apart from the rising capitalistic culture, there seems to be more at play in Russia than just economic development that leads to democracy. Other factors have affected the course of politics in addition to economic principles. Russia’s political culture has been more than welcoming to the type of autocratic leadership that Putin has instituted. “While most Russians are aware of and condemn the regime's human rights violations, and in principle favor liberal democracy, they are also grateful to Putin for restoring Russia's international power and authority” (Hassner). The main issue at stake in Russia, based on Pierre Hassner’s article is whether democratic values should be sacrificed for the sake of international power. Putin provides the strong leadership Russians want, yet has encroached on freedom of the press and, brutally, eliminated potential opposition and increased xenophobia. Putin’s popularity, in spite of his harsh ruling, reminded me of Fareed Zakaria’s illiberal democracy ideal.

Blog 11/5

In the readings for this week, I found the presentation of post-communist countries, particularly post-communist Russia, to be interrelated.  I was most intrigued by what to me seems to be a connection between Howard’s article and Hasner’s article. Hasner articulates the shift in attitude of Russian government toward the west in the recent past. He suggests that Russia, like other countries in the region, seemed to be headed for a democratic system of government. Somewhere along the way, Putin came to power, and despite President Bush looking into his soul, by 2003 Russia’s official stance toward the West echoed cold war era propaganda.  There was a turn away from democracy and toward autocracy in Russia. Howard’s article claims that there is a significant lack of civil society present in post-communist countries. He explains that this is the case for a variety of reasons, not least of which is a general distrust of communal institutions, since under socialist rule citizens were obliged to participate in them, often against their will. I am curious after reading these two articles if anyone has explored the connection between the two phenomena presented. Though admittedly I am less than knowledgeable about the specifics of civil society in Russia and other nearby states, it strikes me as only natural that weak civil society allows for easier subversion of democracy and a smoother path to autocracy.  As far as I am concerned, a lack of significant civil society means a lack of engagement in the government at the level of the everyday individual. Antipathy would seem to be the prevailing mood. Civil society then, is a reflection of the level to which a society cares about its own governance. If a society doesn’t care, it will be swept up by a government that does, and what that government generally cares about is increasing and maintaining its own dominance.  Howard touches on this in his article, saying, “with civic organizations lacking the active support of the population, such a hollow democracy will remain at risk of being toppled by hostile forces, whether based on nondemocratic historical traditions or a new antidemocratic ideology.” I would be interested to read an article that further articulates or debunks this notion, as it seems an entirely logical one to me. If you consider the U.S., with our hundreds of thousands of public organizations, it is hard to imagine a culture of antipathy toward government. We are accustomed to people belonging to groups who have specific agendas and it is ridiculous to imagine our country turning toward an authoritarian system. There would be widespread, organized public outcry. Without a civil society to defend itself, democracy in other parts of world seems far more apt to crumble.

Response #2

The new Russia under Putin’s rule has considerably changed both domestically and internationally. Putin is indeed an autocratic ruler. Hasner starts out by saying, “no matter how dubious public opinions polls or how rigged elections are in Russia, a majority of the people still support Putin” (3). One reason for this, and something that I found quite interesting in this article, could be the concept of deception. It is a predominant strategy that is used by Putin that seeks to “maintain the appearance of democracy while progressively emptying democratic institutions of their content” (4). This is also known as “virtual” or “imitation” democracy. Another reason that the people may feel the need to support Putin is because even though he has done a poor job of creating institutions, civil society, and a rule of law, he has improved Russians’ economic status. Putin at times also showed genuine support the United States, especially in cooperating with terrorism and his immediate offer to support the US after 9/11.

But after 2003, this relationship changed dramatically. And Hassner points out that the evolution of Putin’s policies is heading in the wrong direction. A key aspect of this idea is that many of his policies are strongly reminiscent of fascism. Putin has eliminated any rival centers of power and has also engaged in the “personality cult” by proclaiming himself “leader of the nation.” Post Communist Russia is becoming more and more authoritarian, and it is also showing greater hostility towards its neighbors—Estonia and Georgia, and especially the West. Putin thought that by converting towards democracy Russia would automatically become a duopoly, but that is not the case. I think that Dmitri Trenin sums it when he states, “what Russia craves is respect. It does not want to be a junior partner—it wants to be an equal” (7).

Response #2

My belief is that when it comes to discussing the new Russia, we are once again faced by the challenge of what to do if “free and fair” elections are held, and the people elect, in this instance, an undemocratic ruler. Based on the reading by Pierre Hasner, as well as the view of the international community in general, there is simply no doubting that Vladimir Putin is an autocratic ruler. Today’s Russia lacks the institutions, civil society, and rule of law that characterize a liberal democracy as defined earlier in the semester by Fareed Zakaria. Yet, at the same time, it is believed that the majority of Russians still support Putin, even when considering the dubiousness of public opinion polls. The explanation of this dilemma is rather simple, for as Hasner points out, “[Putin’s] rule is full of contradictions”. Indeed, this is not surprising, as a democracy in line with Russian traditions may well be expected to be full of contradictions, especially since Russia has been historically-conditioned to a single, dominant head of state. While Putin has not hesitated to curtail freedom of expression and has effectively destroyed any notion of a free press, he has succeeded in improving Russia’s economic well-being and, at times, specifically early in his career, has assisted the U.S. and Europe in addressing key international issues. However, there remains serious cause for concern according to Hasner, due to the fact that the trajectory of Putin’s policies is headed in the wrong direction. Not only is there a definitive trend towards increased authoritarianism in Russia’s domestic policies, but also growing hostility towards its neighbors and the West, as well as socio-political trends “reminiscent of fascism”. To justify this last statement, Hasner points to both the elimination of rival power centers and the growing “personality cult” of Putin that evokes memories of the late Turkmenbashi. Furthermore, Russia has gained greater political clout since the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the recent rise in commodities prices. Indeed, this may be one of Putin’s pillars of popular support, because, as Hasner points out, many Russians are “grateful to Putin for restoring Russia’s international power and authority”. But as for the implications of these trends, we must consider the new dynamic of international politics. As Russia struggles through its post-communist transition, the U.S. remains strong, Europe continues to become more united, and China has enjoyed a meteoric rise. Thus, the whole dynamic of Russian foreign relations may soon be forced to change. However, in the near future, the world must be weary of the possible impacts of an illiberal democracy in a country as important to global politics as Russia.

Rich Hussey - Oct 23 - Response #1

On the topic of regime types and the transition to democracy I feel as though a state is less likely to shift to democracy based on their state's history of legitimacy. If legitimacy was always based on one charismatic leader who had a great deal of power than that regime is less likely to transition to a democratic system as long as this man is still alive. This is because the people of the certain state puts so much faith into that person to think for them that they do not seek fit a systems which puts more responsibility on themselves. Although I see it this way I'm sure this theory is easily falsifiable. On Wright's view of British politics I was confused at what his argument was. If he is saying that the British gives us a look on stable politics than he contradicts himself by quoting Andre Mathiot who states, "(the British system is)… an enviable model of democratic government, one can only regret that it could not possibly be transplanted to any other country" ( Wright 2). One part that really caught my attention was the structure of the British Constitution. I wanted to pose a question of would this flexible form of constitutional laws create a more stable system of government in the United States. I believe it would not considering the stress on constitutional laws that is shown in our current system.

Denis McLaughlin Post I

The case of the European Union is an extraordinary one, with roots stretching back to the European Economic Community in order to integrate Europe’s economy in the hopes of avoiding a third world war. Thomas Friedman notes this in his book, The World is Flat¸ indicating that we are entering into a feasibly Post-War era because of economic integration. While Friedman is not the subject of this discussion, he offers an interesting perspective.

The E.U. is also interesting because it does seem to indicate a change in the realm of international politics and political structure, it is one of the more successfully supra-national organizations, bringing to mind the question of whether we are entering into a Post-Westphalia system of international relations. Wright, however, brings up interesting points using Great Britain and the movements (compounded by recent discoveries of oil off the coast of Scotland) for sovereignty in Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland – in the case of Northern Ireland, a return to the Republic of Ireland rather than sovereignty. Many of these issues were mitigated by the introduction of devolution, or allowing more sovereignty in these areas in order to appease those populations.

Whether the European Union will ultimately be successful in its endeavors remains to be determined, however, it is acting contrary to the individual interests of its member states, seeming to progress in the opposite direction of Great Britain. Giving member states greater amounts of autonomy would possibly undermine its entire goal, however, in order to avoid greater stresses, it may have to do so.

John Leer's Response #1

Judt’s discussion in the Epilogue of exiles, namely Jewish exiles, during and after WWII provides a clear analytical framework that demonstrates the conceptual and practical necessity of postnational governing bodies such as the European Union.

The statist system formalized in the Treaty of Westphalia grants states complete sovereignty over the treatment of the state’s resources and population. In many ways, WWII and Nazi Germany serve as an end, at least conceptually, to this system in that it becomes clear that humans have certain rights not by virtue of their status as a citizen but, rather, by virtue of their status as humans. Thus, the criminals indicted at the Nuremberg Trials were charged with ‘crimes against humanity’. In charging the Nazis with this crime, the Allied Forces (and later the signatories of the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights) essentially said that there are limits to a state’s sovereignty.

Once we grant that states’ actions must fall within certain boundaries and that they must fulfill certain obligations to their citizens by virtue of them being humans, the problem becomes ensuring that those people who are not citizens are still granted this obligatory status. Judt discusses at length the problems facing deportees and exiles during and after the war; they were consistently and systematically excluded from the benefits enjoyed by ‘full citizens’ and found it nearly impossible to file grievances in search of compensation. Among many other similar excerpts, Judt writes:

Indeed, in Belgium the exclusion of Jews from any post-war benefits was taken a step further. Since 95 percent of the Jews deported from Belgium had been foreign nationals or stateless, it was determined by a post-war law that – unless they had also fought in the organized resistance movements – surviving Jews who ended up in Belgium after the war would not be eligible for any public aid. (805)

In fact, by 1945 the Swiss had taken in just 28,000 Jews—seven thousand of them before the war began. …the Swiss had made strenuous efforts to keep Jews out… (813)

Upon making similar historical observations, Hannah Arendt accurately comments that exiles and deportees suffer not just from a lack of rights, but rather from a lack of rights to have rights. In other words, these non-citizens are not the sort of entity that can bear rights within a strictly statist system. Thus, although the Nuremberg Trials clearly asserted that humans enjoy certain rights above those that stem from citizenship, it remained the case that one had to be a citizen in order to receive them.

The political (as opposed to the economic) development of the EU has taken great strides to remedy this conflict in establishing the European Court of Justice, thereby granting exiles an avenue to seek justice. However, a great separation still exists between citizens and non-citizens with respect to issues of positive right, namely regarding welfare benefits.

Post War and Wright

In the Introduction to British Politics by Wright, in the very first pages, he describes the British government as a “strong government.” He continues to state that the transition democracy didn’t weaken the British government, but rather strengthen it. The British government was also became stronger and maintained stability during World War II. But we see in The PostWar that this was not the case in Germany. Germany endured extreme circumstances after World War II. The government as well as the economy almost collapsed. As Judt states, The war was not over 1945, he states that millions died after 1945 in result of the war. In Europe a mostly non-democratic, but communist states, were defeated and must rebuilding was needed in Europe? So why didn’t Europe, especially Germany, move towards democracy?

Judt probably answers this question in his book, but I haven’t gotten that far. :/ (hopefully I will). Judt says in Post war that some might say that many would say that the reason for Britain’s stability was planning. In agreement with Judt, I don’t think that this is the answer. In Britain very little planning took place. The real issue was control. The British government nationalized everything from railroads, mines, and transportation. The government took control of everything in Britain Post War. Although this control help stabilize Britain as a whole, I believe the fact that the British didn’t turn away from the government of “tradition” is the main reason for such success. The British knew what they wanted and never attempted to change the make-up of their government, but only make alterations as they went along, as Wright says. The Unconstitutional government of Britain help them transition through the Post war in my opinion, Bottom Line.


This is not to say that British has the perfect government. Like all political structures, I believe it has its flaws and some that in my opinion will cause problems in the future. One thing that grabs my attention the party system in Britain. Wright says that parties are organizers of political choice. I take this to mean that parties can sway people to think a certain way on a topic, even if they don;t agree with it, because they are apart of a certain party. Wright says that party politics in which disciplines of party loyalty stifle independent though and action. People will conform for some ideas that they naturally disagree with. I believe, like Wright that the party system may not still be OK for British politics and it is going to have to change, if it wants to continue to be a "strong" government.

Reading Response #1

For me, the most important idea that our class lectures, the Wright book, and the Judt book have all touched upon with regard to the European Union is the importance of identity politics. In class professor King noted Kissinger’s comic remark about phoning Europe, but it is certainly indicative of a larger issue. It calls into question what it means to be European and how that can be identified. Perhaps more importantly, even if we can establish what it means to be European, it is inevitably going to require a multicultural definition that also calls into question not only the types of policies that the EU can enact (especially at the second and third pillar of European integration) but also the extent to which the EU can expand before it kills the possibility of actually defining what it means to be European beyond mere geographical distinctions.

For example, the Wright book which we discussed last week showed how in Britain the development of various factions within merely the UK, which is a much smaller entity than the EU, has been solved through devolution. Devolution was necessary in Britain because individuals identified more with Scotland, for example, than they did with Britain. In a similar fashion, the EU looks as if it can only succeed to the extent that it enables people to be European over being British, Belgian, German, etc. because the EU seeks to do the opposite of devolve power – its goal is to elevate issues to a body with supranational authority.

Although Wright hinted to the possibility that the EU may have had some success in causing even Britain with its stable political tradition to accept such an authority, Judt’s analysis of postwar Europe suggests that the EU “project” must first resolve issues of identity before it can delve into substantive issues beyond economic policy. Judt makes a striking comment in his introduction about how the destruction of a multicultural identity within European states actually laid the foundation for the postwar success of those states. He says that Stalin and Hitler provided the foundation for the successes of the modern, progressive European welfare state by “[blasting] flat the demographic heath upon which the foundations of a new and less complicated continent were then laid” (9).

Fast forward to today and the enlargement of EU has brought back all the issues of identity that the world wars had in some twisted ways resolved by pushing everyone into “their own country” where they lived among “their own people.” From everything I’ve read on the issue, the biggest barrier to Turkey’s inclusion, for example, may not be its political structure as much as its strong Muslim cultural heritage. Is being European, then, fundamentally being Christian? Or is it not being Muslim? Or both? Or neither?

Judt underlines this fact when he says that “Europe is facing a multicultural future,” and that this “has thrown into relief not just Europe’s current discomfort at the prospect of ever greater variety, but also the ease with which the dead ‘others’ of Europe’s past were cast far out of mind” (9). This ultimately presents the most important dilemma for the expansion of the EU and its authority. As the definition of what it means to be European expands and encompasses more cultures and peoples, its identity becomes murkier. Expansion strengthens the power of the EU, but weakens European identity, a fundamental source of its legitimacy and power. Finally, identity is often characterized in opposition, i.e. in contrast to the “other” that Judt is referring to and it is worth noting that US policymakers would thus be wise to make sure that the EU does not define itself in contrast to America in the future.

Reading Response #1

In British Politics, A Very Short Introduction, Tony Wright identifies key characteristics and ideas of the British tradition, and investigates what makes British politics distinctive. Three things that I found interesting while reading the book were: even though the British system is changing there is still an idea of it remaining constant, the lack of parameters that exist if a party has a majority in the commons, and the idea of devolution.

“The country’s distinctive contribution to civilization has been the development of stable institutions of representative government” (2). What makes the British political system unique is that their constitution is not a set of written laws that must be followed, it is a common law constitution that is continually being “shaped and reshaped by political circumstances and so forever on the move.” Wright argues that even when the reality changes and the British system has fluctuated the outward appearance of British politics looks relatively the same, providing the people with a sense of continuity.

In the British political system, all that is needed to give a party a free governing landscape is a parliamentary majority. “Once in secure possession of this, there was no constitutional rule-book to define the parameters of your power” (13). You could essentially do whatever you want. There is no system of checks and balances or separation of powers. This idea of free reign seems to be a problem due to the absence of a formal written constitution.

There is also this idea of the British political system as changing. This is seen in particular through devolution. For the British political system the devolution of power to Scotland and Wales represented “a fundamental break with a traditionally centralized and unitary state” (28). As of now, the people who argued that it was necessary to change the union in order to save it have been vindicated, but the fact that Scotland and Wales are already demanding more power only tells of future challenges to come…

Midterm Examination Key

Midterm Examination Key

Instructions: Write your answers to the questions below in the blue book. Be sure to number each question. Please write legibly.

Note: Georgetown University is an honor-code school for undergraduates. Cases of suspected academic dishonesty will be handled according to the university’s honor code.

Part I Short Answer (Your response should be no more than a few sentences or a list. 10 pts. each)

1. Briefly describe Marx’s concept of “ideology.”

Best answer should be clearly written and should contain some combination of:

-materialism or historical materialism
-base/superstructure
-relations of production
-system of ideas, culture, beliefs
-causality (ideology as lacking independent causal significance)
-epiphenomenon
-justification / legitimation of relations of production / class relations
-telos / teleology


E.g., ideology is the system of ideas, beliefs, and culture that justifies particular relations of production. This flows from Marx’s materialist conception of history and social life. Material relations are part of the base; ideology and other social epiphenomena are part of superstructure, having no independent causal effects.


2. What is a Condorcet cycle? Does one always occur?

This is the production of incoherent/irrational/intransitive group preference from otherwise rational individual preferences. It does not always occur; in most cases with very limited players and very limited preferences, cycles are unlikely. As you increase both the number of players and the number of preferences, however, the probability of a cycle increases.

Best answers were very clear in the language they used to refer to the group and individual preferences; they mentioned “rational individuals” or “transitive individual preferences” and “irrational” or “intransitive” group preferences arrived at by “aggregation” of individual preferences. They also, in many cases, showed an example (A>B>C>A).

Also, it is important to note that this question had two parts. Best answers to the second part referred to factors that increase the probability of cycles (i.e. group size and preference number).


3. State Arrow’s theorem. What is its significance?

There is no system of translating coherent/rational individual preferences into group preference that does not also either (1) produce irrational/incoherent group preferences or (2) restrict the expression of individual preferences (either across all of society or amongst certain groups, or both). Thus, there is a tradeoff between social rationality and concentration of power. This is “significance” because it means that there is no “natural” majority will and that we must devise sets of rules for determining what we want to count as a majority/group will.

Again, best answers had to give clear responses to both parts of the question.


Part II Long Short Answer (Your answer should be a paragraph. 20 pts. each)

4. Give TWO alternative definitions of a “state” based on lectures, class readings, and discussion sections.

There were a range of possible good responses here. Some possibilities included:

-Marxist
-Institutionalist
-Functionalist
-Weber’s definition
-Aristotle’s definition
-Professor King’s definition of contemporary states from lecture

Most important was to demonstrate your ability to think through two conceptually distinct ways of seeing the idea of a state. The best answers did not simply incorporate the material presented on slides in lecture; they also referred to readings or other sources outside the lecture. The best answers also did not simply restate two definitions from memory (this would receive approximately a B if both definitions were solid), but offered at least some short explanation of where these two definitions came from, how they were different, and why that difference was significant. This could refer, for example, to the malleability of the concept of state and the different types of entities it could include (depending on definition).

5. Describe how plurality, majority, and closed party-list electoral systems work.

A minimally acceptable answer (that is, something in the C to B range) included:

Plurality: most votes wins
Majority: 50% plus one to win; second round if no one achieves this in first round
Party-list: vote for individual parties rather than candidates (in close list form); seats apportioned according to some proportional formula.

Best answers went into district magnitude, allocation method, form of candidature, etc. An answer could also get top credit if it included almost all of this information on each system and also mentioned some of the effects of each system.


6. What is “civil society”? How does the idea of “social capital” relate to it?

A minimally acceptable answer (that is, something in the C to B range, so about 14-17 depending on precision, etc.) included:

Secondary forms of association in society (interest groups, non-state organizations, durable social networks, etc) that exist midway between and help mediate relations between primary social groups (families/ kinship groups) and the state. Social capital as glue/connections among groups within civil society. Some reference to the several components of social capital mentioned in lecture.

Best answers nailed the definition of civil society (either that given in lecture or a similar variant drawn from a seminal text on the subject), demonstrated a clear understanding of the concept of social capital (describing or defining it in terms of “norms,” “trust,” “reciprocity,” and “networks”), demonstrated a clear distinction between these concepts and then showed how they were related, and referenced some of the relevant authors (Putnam, Tocqueville, etc) that we have discussed in relation to these concepts and findings. The discussion of the relationship between civil society and social capital could argue that social capital helps facilitate strong civil society (by allowing people to engage more fruitfully in collective action) or that civil society generally builds social capital (by bringing more people into contact with each other, building networks, and facilitating trust and reciprocity with individuals outside the immediate family). The very best answers pointed to both of these dynamics and linked them to the authors.


7. What is “the tragedy of the commons”? How does it relate to the idea of a public good?

The minimal correct answer (again, about C-B or 14-17/20) included a description of the “tragedy” as the diminution of common pool resources as a result of the individual rational self-interest maximization of all group members. The answer also had to include some notion of “public good” and how it related to the “tragedy.”

Better answers mentioned the distinction between public and private goods, using terms such as rivalrous/nonrivalrous and excludable/nonexcludable. The very best answers also showed consciousness of the difference between “public goods” (that are nonrivalrous, such as a lighthouse or public transportation service), “common goods” (that are rivalrous, such as the park bench or natural resources), and the differences and similarities between the problems that relate to each (collective action problems, free rider problem, tragedy of the commons). These answers also mentioned some of the ways in which authors (Hardin, Olson) recommend addressing these problems and protecting public and common goods (regulation, privatization, selective incentives).


8. How do we judge whether some theories in political science are better than others?

The minimal answer (about C- or 13/20) for this question included at least a reference to all five of the characteristics we discussed in class: generality, accuracy, parsimony, falsifiability, and causality. Additional credit was given for accurate descriptions of each of these (through about B+ or 18/20). The very best answers did a little more than just list these characteristics and their definitions, also mentioning the tradeoff between accuracy and generality, the significance of falsifiability (as opposed to earlier notions of verification), and possibly providing a couple of illustrations.


Part III Essay (70 pts.)

Choose ONE of the following. Remember: Your essay must make an argument by staking out a position and then supporting that position with evidence.

A. Describe the effects of different electoral systems on the outcome of elections. That is, how do the methods we use affect the answers we get? And why is there such a diversity of electoral systems in use around the world?

B. Using what you know of models and theories in political science, design a political science research project to test any of the various theories of any ONE of the following: Marx, Weber, Huntington, Hardin, Duverger. Describe such a project, its structure, its sources of data, and its chief hypothesis.

C. Describe and analyze a real-world collective action problem that we have not discussed during lectures. What allowed the collective action problem to be overcome, or what prevented collective action from occurring?


For the essays, length is not the sole criterion, but in general they should be about 2-3 pages or so of text at a minimum. Foremost was whether the essay answered the question. Then, I was looking for some clarity of argument—a set of coherent points supported with some evidence. Reference to readings was definitely a plus and often was a major part of what distinguished a genuinely “A” answer from the rest.


On essay A, it was vital to realize that there were two parts of the question and to make sure to address each of these. First, you needed to give some general explanation of how electoral systems affect outcomes (many people very thoughtfully framed this in terms of Condorcet, Arrow, the lack of a majority will apart from the institutions used to measure it, etc), and you needed to describe what the effects are of different systems. It was key that you needed to really talk about the EFFECTS of electoral rules. Answers that simply described each system (which you already did for question 5 above) were not awarded nearly as many points. Some of the factors we were looking for included (though not limited to): compromise/inclusiveness, efficiency/effectiveness, accountability, stability, simplicity/tradition, number of parties usually generated, representativeness (of minorities, women, etc), centripitalism/moderation, affects on multi-ethnic populations, how issues get divided amongst parties, preference salience, etc.

For the second question, you had make a theoretical argument as to what accounts for the wide variety of electoral systems that exist internationally. Ideally, your answer to this question was stated as a clear thesis in your introduction and was then either addressed alongside the effects or was handled in the second part of your essay. You needed to demonstrate some knowledge, based on the readings, of why countries might choose or end up with different systems, either based on those systems’ effects (e.g., in cases of ethnically divided societies) or based on history/values. The very best answers addressed the different paths by which electoral systems are created in different states: some by gradual historical evolution or carryover from earlier institutions, some by conscious values- or needs- based choice (where a system was selected to best protect values held by that society or to best handle particular social or demographic tensions). As long as a strong argument was made and backed up by some supporting evidence, however, there was a fair degree of flexibility in acceptable answers (historical path dependency, conscious choice, values, needs of a particular type of society, etc).

Authors that were relevant to this question included: Condorcet, Arrow, Reilly, Norris, Lijphart, Soudriette and Ellis, Burke, Mirabeau, Duverger, North, Rosenfeld, Alesina, …

The very best answers were well structured as responses to both questions, dealt with most of the major systems that we had studied (i.e., plurality, majority, proportional representation, preferential, and possibly the mixed types STV and AV), marshaled the ideas of a number of different authors, referred to at least a few examples of countries to demonstrate points, and made a clear thoughtful argument concerning the origins of variation in system design (not just a quick response in the final paragraph to this part of the question).


Essay B: For this question I wanted to see clear scientific reasoning. You needed to describe clearly what the theoretical model was you planned to test, and then develop an experiment in order to test it. In addition to showing full understanding of the theory being tested, your answer needed to also demonstrate a clear grasp of scientific method and theory judgment criteria. You needed to be conscious of how to apply concepts such as falsifiability and generality to the evaluation of a real theoretical model. (Implicitly, you must show that the theory you intend to test is falsifiable. Also, one clear mistake here was to conceptualize the test as an attempt to “prove” the model correct. This failed to grasp the idea that theories cannot be verified through experimentation, only falsified.)

Best answers laid out a clear neat experimental design, thoughtfully considered the data sources to be used, and correctly identified what hypothesized outcome would correspond with the theory’s predictions and which hypothesized outcome would violate these expectations and falsify the theory. Best answers also generally included some reference to the general principles by which good theories can be judged (discussed in question 8).


Essay C: This essay required that you develop a clear example that demonstrated your comfortable with key concepts from collective action theory and that you can see how these interrelate and apply to real world problems. Your answer had to include: a clear description of the collective action problem at hand, a description of what happened and if the problem was ever overcome, and an explanation for why this was and what factors either allowed or prevented collective action from occurring.

Best answers to this question showed precisely how the problem they had described could be modeled in terms of collective action theory concepts. They clearly identified who the (potential) collective actors were (individuals, groups, countries, etc), what their interests were, and what public or common good was at stake. This last element was particularly relevant, because it requires reframing the “collective action” problem to think “what is in this for everybody?” There are some things that we inherently know are collective action problems, but we do not usually think of in terms of the non-excludable good that they provide. But reframing the question in terms of what the benefit is that all group members can expect (at least in the long term) can help generate a more fruitful analysis of the individual group member’s rational weighting of interests and how that might have led to the particular outcome being explained.

Best answers to this question demonstrated a familiarity with the theoretical explanations for what factors make collective action problems easier or harder to solve. This might include: group size, anonymity versus reputation, values and norms of behavior, individual rationality, free rider and tragedy of the commons problems, levels of social capital (norms of trust and reciprocity in the given group or society, pre-existing networks of relationships), regulation, privatization, and selective incentives. Best answers also referenced some of the literature we have read or discussed on this or closely related and relevant subjects (Olson, Hardin, Putnam, Tocqueville,…) Clear logical argument justifying a plausible causal explanation for the collective action outcome (i.e. success or failure) was also key.

Response # 1

After reading last weeks articles on Regimes and Transitions viewing democracy as the dominant world ideology (when referring to regimes) seems much less plausible. Fifty percent of the countries currently transitioning to democracy are seen as Illiberal Democracies, as Fareed Zakaria outlined in his “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy.” Along with Zakaria’s “Illiberal Democracies,” Corothers “Gray Zone” and Livitskey and Way’s “Competitive Authoritarianism” are two similar approaches to understanding these seemingly false democracies. With just fifty percent of nations fully transitioning to democratic regimes, there becomes a large misconception regarding what it means to be a democratic regime. As Zakaria stated, this misconception leads to the greatest thread posed by Illiberal Democracies, which is its ability to enable the discredit of Liberal Democracies.

One of the best ways at understanding this type of transition is best understood by examining the post-Cold War nations, which Levitskey and Way outlined in their “Competitive Authoritarianism.” I find it interesting that most of the post-Cold War regimes transitioning to democracy were externally influenced, which in turn resulted in many non-democratic democracies. With this said, many of these nations were ethnically, religiously, and/or racially divided, however, none of these conditions were true for the nations exerting external influences, largely the United States. Finally, with this knowledge, when comparing the cultures, politics, and ideologies of the United States and Iraq, should we be pessimistic towards assuming that the reconstruction of Iraq, like many other reformed nations in the Middle East, will result as a non-democratic Democracy? Finally, ironically enough, the possible collapse of democracy may actually be the result of its coercive promotion.