Competitive Authoritarianism is Serious Business

“The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism” by Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way provides insight into a type of nondemocratic and non-authoritarian regime into which post-Cold War nations degenerated: Competitive Authoritarianism. This system results when some form of existing democratic institutions within a state provide the principal means for obtaining political power, but autocratic incumbents undermine the rules of these institutions just enough to maintain power unfairly. Basically it is the difference between the substantive and procedural elements of pluralist (in this case, democratic) regimes which King mentioned in lecture. Procedurally, post-Cold War countries like Russia, Ukraine, and Serbia (just a few examples of many provided in the article) appear to possess legitimate democratic elections, but substantively, they typically take on more authoritarian practices. But once one digs deeper into the underlying processes involved in these “democratic” elections, one finds the autocratic incumbents engaging in actions of questionable legality (bribes, threats, and other co-optation devices) to suppress potential opposition parties. Major fraud, such as stacking elections in one’s party’s favor, remains rare among incumbents due to the risks involved, including being removed from office.

“Competitive Authoritarianism (CA)” is a humorously ironic title. Levitsky and Way propose that parties within weak and fragmented states did not possess the resources or ability to successfully repress all opposition to form a purely authoritarian regime. Due to pressures from the victorious, democratic West, they adopted a regime type that contained elements of both democracy and authoritarianism in which parties compete for power to use to repress potential opposing parties to the best of their abilities.

How long does this cycle continue? Is Competitive Authoritarianism a permanent regime type, or will it eventually transition into pure authoritarianism or democracy? For CA countries like those in Africa, the prospects for emerging from the cycle remain grim. Lijphart and Reilly provide an argument for the necessity of a PR type of pluralist system in countries as deeply divided as these. Theirs is a reasonable point; a PR system would create a necessity for balance between groups who are in stark opposition to each under the CA system. Despite this, parties in power enjoy power and see no need for forfeiting it by introducing a new, more representative regime type. What’s more, if the current party in power in a given CA country fails due to a scandal or some other factor, an opposition party would rise to take the reigns. Therefore it’s reasonable to conclude that Competitive Authoritarianism is not merely a stage but a very real regime type in and of itself.

Response #2

I would like to highlight another common element present in many of the articles for this week. Most of the authors underscore the importance of political history, institutional legacies, the type of nondemocratic rule and other structural features in developing and maintaining a functioning and stable 'liberal' democracy.

Fareed Zakaria points out, "Every single country in the Third World that emerged from colonial rule since the Second World War with a population of at least one million (and almost all the smaller colonies as well) with a continuous democratic experience is a former British colony." This is the result, according to Zakaria, of Britain's emphasis on constitutional liberalism, law and administration and not an emphasis on democracy. With the majority of the 'third wave' of democracies shifting to Carothers' 'Gray zone', Zakaria notes, "Constitutional liberalism has led to democracy, but democracy does not seem to bring constitutional liberalism."

Among the five core assumptions that define the transitional period that Carothers examines, the fourth assumption states that, "the underlying conditions in transitional countries will not be major factors in either the onset or the outcome of the transition process." Carothers' disproves this assumption by noting that "Looking at the more successful recent cases of democratization, for example, which tend to be found in Central Europe, the Southern Cone, or East Asia, it is clear that relative economic wealth, as well as past experience with political pluralism, contributes to the chances for democratic success."

Levitsky and Way also note the importance of past institutions and structural features to the success of liberal democracy. They note, "Linkages to the West—in the form of cultural and media influence, elite networks, demonstration effects, and direct pressure from Western governments—appear to have raised the costs of authoritarian entrenchment, making the democratization of competitive authoritarian regimes more likely."

In today's age of fashionable democratic rule, a respectful and nuanced approach to tackling problems arising from the "hybrid" democracies must take into account the history of political, economic and institutional legacies of each country. Such an approach would appreciate the long and difficult progress countries must make in order to become successful democracies and would try to move beyond quick expectations that hinder democratic development.

Response #1

A common theme in this week’s readings was the many faults with not only the “democratization” process, but also the fact that “for better or for worse, we are ‘stuck’ with democracy as the catchword of contemporary political discourse.” It is evident as to how this occurred -- the Soviet collapse and the end of communism as a viable political alternative -- but there remain unanswered questions as to the consequences of democracy’s assumed dominance. This is no better represented than by the widespread use of the transition paradigm, and as per Thomas Carothers, the end of its useful life. While for many years, the assumption was that if countries were moving away from authoritarian rule, it meant that they were moving along a path towards democratization, Carothers believes that this no longer holds true. Instead, the majority of countries have entered a “gray zone” in which countries are “neither dictatorial nor clearly headed toward democracy.”

These “gray zone” countries could be characterized as the hybrid regimes discusses by Levitsky and Way, which are defined as those nations that have “combined democratic rules with authoritarian governance.” In “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy,” Zakaria discusses this same issue under the title of “illiberal democracy,” in which democracy may be present, but constitutional liberalism is not. According to Zakaria, it is more important to facilitate the development of liberal constitutionalism -- as defined by the rule of law, personal freedoms, independent judiciary, etc… -- than to fulfill our misguided view that democratization alone will result in superior governance. This claim is further supported by Schmitter and Karl’s argument that “the specific form democracy takes is contingent upon a country’s…entrenched state structures and policy practices.” Thus, by establishing the necessary institutions of constitutional liberalism, it is possible to prompt countries toward liberal democracy and stop the proliferation of hybrid regimes.

Continuing Trends?

In his article “The End of the Transition Paradigm”, Thomas Carothers argues that the idea that states undergo a natural transition from authoritarianism to a more democratic society is outdated and irrelevant in today’s world. Many of the countries which Western political scientists consider to be “in transition” have not only failed to become liberal democratic states, but some have become even more oppressive. While this may be the case for some countries, the general trends presented by Larry Diamond in his article on hybrid regimes seem to hold true.
Ok, let’s crunch some numbers…
Diamond uses statistics from Freedom House to examine the change in political regimes from 1974 to 2001. Have the trends that he pointed out continued in the last seven years?

2001 2008
Number of liberal democracies 73 79
(1.0-2.0 on the 7- point scale)

Number of repressive regimes 21 17
(6.5-7.0 on the 7-point scale)


1974 2001 2008
Average score worldwide 4.47 3.47 3.23

I have selected a few of the more telling statistics, but similar comparisons by region and regime type offer similar results. It seems, then, that Diamond’s belief in a worldwide transition towards democracy continues to be supported by the data. This offers no insight into any particular country case study, but it does support the classical transition paradigm.