Response # 1

After reading last weeks articles on Regimes and Transitions viewing democracy as the dominant world ideology (when referring to regimes) seems much less plausible. Fifty percent of the countries currently transitioning to democracy are seen as Illiberal Democracies, as Fareed Zakaria outlined in his “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy.” Along with Zakaria’s “Illiberal Democracies,” Corothers “Gray Zone” and Livitskey and Way’s “Competitive Authoritarianism” are two similar approaches to understanding these seemingly false democracies. With just fifty percent of nations fully transitioning to democratic regimes, there becomes a large misconception regarding what it means to be a democratic regime. As Zakaria stated, this misconception leads to the greatest thread posed by Illiberal Democracies, which is its ability to enable the discredit of Liberal Democracies.

One of the best ways at understanding this type of transition is best understood by examining the post-Cold War nations, which Levitskey and Way outlined in their “Competitive Authoritarianism.” I find it interesting that most of the post-Cold War regimes transitioning to democracy were externally influenced, which in turn resulted in many non-democratic democracies. With this said, many of these nations were ethnically, religiously, and/or racially divided, however, none of these conditions were true for the nations exerting external influences, largely the United States. Finally, with this knowledge, when comparing the cultures, politics, and ideologies of the United States and Iraq, should we be pessimistic towards assuming that the reconstruction of Iraq, like many other reformed nations in the Middle East, will result as a non-democratic Democracy? Finally, ironically enough, the possible collapse of democracy may actually be the result of its coercive promotion.

CHJ Response #1

In November of 1997 when Fareed Zakaria wrote his article on illiberal democracy he made a number of interesting observations on the divergence of democratic institutions and constitutional liberalism. He observes that the number of illiberal democracies has risen. He measures this phenomenon by counting the regimes that employ more liberal democratic election mechanisms than they do liberal civil protections, and concludes that the percentage of the worlds democracies that are illiberal rose from 22% in 1990 to 50% in 1997. This is not an independent phenomenon or even a byproduct of poorly conceived foreign policy; it is a direct result of a western philosophy of democratization at all costs. Democratization theory in the West for too long has hinged on the assumption that a move to democracy was inevitable once a nation started in that direction. The resulting policies of world economic institutions, U.S. aid initiatives and U.S. State Department projects have been focused almost exclusively on facilitating the basic mechanisms of voting, rather than the social conditions necessary for the sustenance of democracy.

Zakaria’s discussion eleven years ago about the multifaceted relationship between democracy in the abstract and constitutional liberalism is perhaps more pertinent today when taken in the context of U.S. foreign policy, than it was even in the time of his writing. Over the last half decade the Untied States has made the spread of democracy a cornerstone of its stated foreign policy objectives. This aim failed to recognize the validity of Zakaria’s insightful observations, and the ensuing quagmires in Iraq and Afghanistan can be seen as derivatives of this lack of understanding the differences between democracy and liberal society. We are just now recognizing that tens of thousands of purple thumbed voters on CNN will not necessarily vote to extend to their fellow citizens the freedoms widely accepted in the West.

Thoughts on the British Political System and Democritization

I thought that Tony Wright's examination of the British political system tied in well with out discussion of democritization in the modern era. Wright goes into detail about the unique form that democracy takes in Britain and its constant evolution. He argues that the British system is always in a state of fluctuation, which he categorizes into three waves of major change following the Second World War. The first of these waves is associated with Prime Minister Clement Attlee, when the Labour Party first took the stage as the majority party in Parliament. The second of these waves is associated with Margaret Thatcher's time in office, in which the Conservative Party came back to power and deflated the role of the state in the nation's economy. And the final of these major waves occurred when Tony Blair was appointed Prime Minister, during whose administration the new British political system sought to fuse the two previous waves' views, "reconciling market economics with social justice" (Wright 43). The point Wright is making is that though the British system is always changing, there is an underlying principe that remains constant. This is, according to Wright, the system's top-down structure and its concentration of power, paramount to the functioning of British politics. 

The British example can be thought of in the context of democratization because it is the system many states attempt to emulate in forming their own democracies. In the case of the United States, though the styles of democracy are different in each, they both share the same core, underlying values. Both subscribe to the requirements from democracy laid out in Schmitter and Karl's essay, "What Democracy is...and is not." But in the modern era of democratization, will it be as easy to export our American political values to "hopefully emerging democracies"? Is it true that states can only be democratized (or democratized well) if they have a.) a history of democracy, b.) a culture willing to embrace democracy, c.) an ethnic make-up that lends itself well to a plural system, d.) all of the above, or is none of this relevant? Yes the British political system could be transposed to the American context, but can democracy emerge in places where there is no precedent for it?

Reaction #2

Reading Tony Wright's British Politics, a Very Short Introduction, I was struck by how few checks exist in the British political system on the power of a party with a majority in the Commons. This problem is seemingly aggravated by the absence of any single written constitution. Wright remarks on this himself, quoting an American ambassador to London: “It took me a long time to understand that a British government, with a simple majority in the House of Commons, can do pretty much what it wants to.”(11).

Wright puts several reasons forward as to why, despite this “strong government,” Britain has not fallen under the sway of tyranny. One way, Wright suggests, that this problem can be avoided is through competing factions and interests within the ruling executive. Because the executive consists of not just the Prime Minister, but other ministers as well, the opposition can find differences between the ministers to get their own agendas through even if they are not in power. Because the executive is made up of several individuals, rather than one, different agendas will still find their way into political discourse.

Another argument states that, although Britain does not have a single constitutional document, the vast collection of opinions, edicts, and legislation that make up the constitution create enough inherent checks on the rule of a majority party in the Commons. In the 18^th century, for example, the constitution created after the 1688 Glorious Revolution was considered enough checks on the power of the monarchs, aristocracy, and Commons.

While these two explanations may create enough checks on the power of a majority party, it seems like this system has broken down in the past. For example, in the 1970's, Lord Hailsham said the Labour government was an 'elective dictatorship', and Wright says that phrase would apply well to Margaret Thatcher's government. It seems from this like the British system of checks and balances is at best tenuous. But this should not be surprising, since our own checks and balances in the United States, to pick a country, are so fragile themselves.

Regimes and Transitions Blog Post - Will Sommer - Response #1

The readings this week consider a phenomenon in state change: the development of a different kind of regime. Fareed Zakaria calls them illiberal democracies, Levitsky and Way calls them competitive authoritarianism, and Carothers says these regimes exist in a sort of gray zone. They are all describing the same regime, however, one where power derives from democratic apparatus abused by those in power.

The articles say that for most of the 20^th century there was a consensus that authoritarian countries would move towards democracy. Countries that combined elements of both government types, like some African or post-communist states, were considered on their way to democracy. Carothers calls this the transition paradigm, a model that assumes countries removing authoritarian elements from their systems will become more democratic. For example, when the Republic of China lifted martial law, it was seen as moving towards democracy instead of any other form of government.

Levitsky and Way argue, though, that this model does not take into account the existence of hybrid regimes that combine elements of authoritarianism and democracy but have no intention of becoming democracies. There are several countries (Zimbabwe, Russia) that reduced the level of authoritarianism in their systems but are not moving towards democracy. Instead, Levitsky and Way say, they are models of competitive authoritarianism, where the ruling group manipulates electoral machinery to maintain its power.

Carothers describes a similar type of regime when talking about “dominant power politics,” characterized by the some democracy, some political space, a dominant group, and some opposition parties. From Levitsky and Way's and Carothers's descriptions, these kind of regimes sound like entities separate from states that are actually transitioning to democracy.

10/16/08

Competitive Authoritarianism is Serious Business

“The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism” by Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way provides insight into a type of nondemocratic and non-authoritarian regime into which post-Cold War nations degenerated: Competitive Authoritarianism. This system results when some form of existing democratic institutions within a state provide the principal means for obtaining political power, but autocratic incumbents undermine the rules of these institutions just enough to maintain power unfairly. Basically it is the difference between the substantive and procedural elements of pluralist (in this case, democratic) regimes which King mentioned in lecture. Procedurally, post-Cold War countries like Russia, Ukraine, and Serbia (just a few examples of many provided in the article) appear to possess legitimate democratic elections, but substantively, they typically take on more authoritarian practices. But once one digs deeper into the underlying processes involved in these “democratic” elections, one finds the autocratic incumbents engaging in actions of questionable legality (bribes, threats, and other co-optation devices) to suppress potential opposition parties. Major fraud, such as stacking elections in one’s party’s favor, remains rare among incumbents due to the risks involved, including being removed from office.

“Competitive Authoritarianism (CA)” is a humorously ironic title. Levitsky and Way propose that parties within weak and fragmented states did not possess the resources or ability to successfully repress all opposition to form a purely authoritarian regime. Due to pressures from the victorious, democratic West, they adopted a regime type that contained elements of both democracy and authoritarianism in which parties compete for power to use to repress potential opposing parties to the best of their abilities.

How long does this cycle continue? Is Competitive Authoritarianism a permanent regime type, or will it eventually transition into pure authoritarianism or democracy? For CA countries like those in Africa, the prospects for emerging from the cycle remain grim. Lijphart and Reilly provide an argument for the necessity of a PR type of pluralist system in countries as deeply divided as these. Theirs is a reasonable point; a PR system would create a necessity for balance between groups who are in stark opposition to each under the CA system. Despite this, parties in power enjoy power and see no need for forfeiting it by introducing a new, more representative regime type. What’s more, if the current party in power in a given CA country fails due to a scandal or some other factor, an opposition party would rise to take the reigns. Therefore it’s reasonable to conclude that Competitive Authoritarianism is not merely a stage but a very real regime type in and of itself.

Response #2

I would like to highlight another common element present in many of the articles for this week. Most of the authors underscore the importance of political history, institutional legacies, the type of nondemocratic rule and other structural features in developing and maintaining a functioning and stable 'liberal' democracy.

Fareed Zakaria points out, "Every single country in the Third World that emerged from colonial rule since the Second World War with a population of at least one million (and almost all the smaller colonies as well) with a continuous democratic experience is a former British colony." This is the result, according to Zakaria, of Britain's emphasis on constitutional liberalism, law and administration and not an emphasis on democracy. With the majority of the 'third wave' of democracies shifting to Carothers' 'Gray zone', Zakaria notes, "Constitutional liberalism has led to democracy, but democracy does not seem to bring constitutional liberalism."

Among the five core assumptions that define the transitional period that Carothers examines, the fourth assumption states that, "the underlying conditions in transitional countries will not be major factors in either the onset or the outcome of the transition process." Carothers' disproves this assumption by noting that "Looking at the more successful recent cases of democratization, for example, which tend to be found in Central Europe, the Southern Cone, or East Asia, it is clear that relative economic wealth, as well as past experience with political pluralism, contributes to the chances for democratic success."

Levitsky and Way also note the importance of past institutions and structural features to the success of liberal democracy. They note, "Linkages to the West—in the form of cultural and media influence, elite networks, demonstration effects, and direct pressure from Western governments—appear to have raised the costs of authoritarian entrenchment, making the democratization of competitive authoritarian regimes more likely."

In today's age of fashionable democratic rule, a respectful and nuanced approach to tackling problems arising from the "hybrid" democracies must take into account the history of political, economic and institutional legacies of each country. Such an approach would appreciate the long and difficult progress countries must make in order to become successful democracies and would try to move beyond quick expectations that hinder democratic development.