Wright puts several reasons forward as to why, despite this “strong government,” Britain has not fallen under the sway of tyranny. One way, Wright suggests, that this problem can be avoided is through competing factions and interests within the ruling executive. Because the executive consists of not just the Prime Minister, but other ministers as well, the opposition can find differences between the ministers to get their own agendas through even if they are not in power. Because the executive is made up of several individuals, rather than one, different agendas will still find their way into political discourse.
Another argument states that, although Britain does not have a single constitutional document, the vast collection of opinions, edicts, and legislation that make up the constitution create enough inherent checks on the rule of a majority party in the Commons. In the 18th century, for example, the constitution created after the 1688 Glorious Revolution was considered enough checks on the power of the monarchs, aristocracy, and Commons.
While these two explanations may create enough checks on the power of a majority party, it seems like this system has broken down in the past. For example, in the 1970's, Lord Hailsham said the Labour government was an 'elective dictatorship', and Wright says that phrase would apply well to Margaret Thatcher's government. It seems from this like the British system of checks and balances is at best tenuous. But this should not be surprising, since our own checks and balances in the United States, to pick a country, are so fragile themselves.
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