Do we care about the result or the theory?

In the Tragedy of the Commons article, Hardin briefly mentions an incident where the mayor and city council decided to make parking free during the Christmas holiday. He criticizes this act and remarks, “Cynically, we suspect that they gained more votes than they lost by this retrogressive act.” This begs the question of whether people are aware of the results certain policies produce or if they pay more attention to how appealing the policy sounds in itself. The simple act of making parking free during the holidays probably (as Hardin supposes as well) raised the mayor’s approval rating, despite the negative implications of such a stunt. During certain times parking is harder to come by and people attribute this to the influx of people rather than the choices of politicians, so the act of parking be made free is assessed as a gift from the city whereas the lack of parking is blamed on fellow parkers.

This concept of acts being assessed theoretically as opposed to practically is mentioned again in the article “Why doesn’t the US have a European-Style Welfare State.” The authors mention Sweden as the archetype of a state with a sizeable welfare state and then go on to say that in 25 years after it became a welfare state it dropped from fourth highest income per capita to sixteenth-place. I am always disgusted with the United State’s lag behind European welfare states, but this example brought to my awareness that I too fall victim to forming opinions based on how a policy sounds, rather than what it does in reality. Honestly, despite knowing about possible negative side effects of an extensive welfare state, I would still irrationally support the US’ adoption of increased welfare programs. So do voters care about ideas or results?

Response #2

“Institutions,” by Douglass C. North, and “Why Doesn’t the United States Have a European-Style Welfare State?” by Alesina, et al., both describe the way formal and informal institutions can influence each other’s development and in turn affect human behavior on many levels.

North begins by outlining the basic collective action dilemma we saw in lecture: cooperation is difficult to sustain when the game is not repeated, when uncertainty exists, and when the group is very large. He then discusses generally the evolution from a tribal society to an urban one, explaining how institutions were gradually developed to overcome this game theory dilemma which arises under the conditions mentioned above. His discussion successfully demonstrates how, when informal institutions like kinship ties can no longer be relied on, other more formal institutions are necessarily created, giving as an example “effective, impersonal contract enforcement.” This is necessary because when people are dealing with strangers, rather than individuals with whom they or their kin have a long and storied report, uncertainty increases, necessitating a formal institution to lower that uncertainty and facilitate exchange.

The article by Alesina, et al., argues that certain political, economic, and social institutions peculiar to the United States (at least in relation to Europe) have caused its government to steer away from the more progressive redistribution schemes popular in Europe. This article gives a convincing overview of the differences in the two economic systems, but fails to convincingly link many of the institutions within the United States and Europe to the economic policies. For example, the authors use data showing Europeans are less charitable than are Americans to suggest that “Europe’s more generous provision of welfare does not stem from a greater innate endowment of altruism in Europe.” As we learned earlier in the month, arguments often confuse correlation for causation, and that may be the case here. It may even be a case of causation in the opposite direction: perhaps Europeans feel less of an obligation to give to the poor because the government redistributes a greater percentage of their income (at least among the wealthier classes) to the poor already, and because poverty levels are relatively moderate in many European countries. The authors also fail to substantiate many of their assumptions about American views toward the poor (which may be correct) in the rigorous manner in which they treated the data which pointed to the differences in the American and European redistributional schemes.

Rosenfeld cont.

I hate to seem like a follower, but from what I read of Jenny's post she seems to have hit the nail on the head with the thoughts that I considered throughout my reading of "What Democracy?".

While I do find the essay very interesting, a lot of Rosenfeld's arguments for abolishing the Senate can just as easily be flipped around to argue against the abolition of the Senate. Rosenfeld complains throughout the essay that smaller states control more power than larger states and that small states could all band together to thwart larger states and prevent legislation. He concludes by saying that the idea of protecting small states against larger states is "pure mythology," which seems odd after he spends 10 pages explaining how we need to protect large states from small states.

Can we not conclude, however, that if the Senate were abolished, the tables would be turned? If we were to use such a highly hypothetical situation as Rosenfeld uses, wouldn't it follow that a small number of states would rule tyrannically over a larger number of small states? Rosenfeld dodges this question with a roundabout answer, but can't we easily imagine a situation in which a smaller state was not able to get funding for a service needed because the (fewer) large states didn't deem it as appropriate as their states' needs? We cannot so easily dismiss the issue of "mob rule," for it would in many situations leave out the little man/state as James Madison predicted could happen in The Federalist Papers.

If Rosenfeld is serious, why not take it one step further and redraw state lines such that a state's political geography mirrors its population? This would be closer to the British system, because we could then have smaller states, meaning more representatives, more choices, more voices, etc. etc. Because all states will have an equal population, we won't have to worry about any states being exploited like Rosenfeld feels they are. Isn't this an equally improbable, but more effective way of enacting democracy?

We the People

I thought that Rosenfeld's article brought up some truly fascinating points about the nature of the U.S. Senate. Since grade school, the bicameral system is lauded as an important component of the separation of powers within the U.S. government. Prior to reading Rosenfeld's article, I never questioned the truth of this assumption. I have to say though that I am pretty persuaded by his comparison of the Senate to the House of Lords in England; in 2000 the average cost of a successful Senate campaign was $7 million, something that de facto suggests a wealth prerequisite to serving in the Senate. While I would not agree with Rosenfeld's rather radical call to eliminate the Senate altogether, I think it might be appropriate for some measures to be taken (similar to those Rosenfeld mentioned were instituted in England to the House of Lords) to curtail their powers in the interest of the U.S. government being more representative of the people. When you think about it, it makes a lot of sense that a larger number of representatives, each serving a smaller constituency, would be more suited to represent their population of people than someone attempting to represent an entire state, particularly in states with highly heterogeneous populations with widely varying interests. In my opinion, the essence of representative government is that people are represented in proportion to their numbers, a principle reflected in the House of Representatives but not the Senate (as Rosenfeld repeatedly points out). He also makes a good point that congresspeople are more accountable since they serve shorter terms, allowing their constituents to vote them out if they are displeased with how they are being represented.
Another really good point Rosenfeld made was his discussion of Jefferson's rewording of Locke's phrase "life, liberty, and estates," to "Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness," in order to emphasize that property-ownership should not be a requirement for office-holding or voting (something many of the other Founders disagreed with). This quote by Jefferson is still very relevant today: "I have not observed men's honesty to increase with their riches." Considering the exponentially growing campaign costs from election cycle to election cycle, it seems that now there is a de facto requirement of either great personal wealth or great patronage from private business for a candidate to successfully run a campaign (especially for President, but this could apply in the Senate as well). Both of these options are highly problematic; the first excludes 99% of the population from running for office, and the second creates a set of people (the business-owners contributing millions to campaigns) whose interests tend to receive special attention (which is of course why they donate so much in the first place) and undermine the spirit of a representative government. I think the most important point made by Rosenfeld was that the Constitution was never intended to be a completely fixed, inflexible, eternal document but rather was supposed to be revised to suit the needs of the time. It seems that people often forget that now, but since our current system is far from perfect, perhaps some thought should be put into how best to improve it.

Save the Senate

While Rosenfeld’s article raises some interesting concerns about the nature of American democracy, his proposal to abolish the US Senate seems to conflict with some of the tenets of American ideology that he holds so dear. Majority rule is the basis of democratic rule, and in its truest form, the “will of the people” translates into the “the will of most people”. In the case of the House of Representatives, the nine largest states represent the 218 votes needed for a voting majority. True, these nine states make up roughly 50 percent of the US population, but what happened to the good old American ideal that says everyone has a voice?
The Founding Fathers realized that majority rule can be a very dangerous thing. The purpose of the system of checks and balances is to protect against this “tyranny of the majority” and to provide a forum for everyone’s voice to be heard. Should the Representatives from New York have more say on an agricultural reform bill than all the breadbasket states of the Great Plains combined? Would the Congressmen representing the half a million people living in Wyoming even find it worth a trip to the Capitol to vote? The Senate protects the interests of these states which (although they may have a small percentage of the US population) may have a disproportionate share of land or natural resources.
The US system isn’t perfect by any means, but it attempts to heed the popular will while preserving the minority voice. It seems like Rosenfeld’s beef with the US system would be better addressed by reforming resource allocation and federal funding to the states, not by abolishing the US Senate.