Competitive Authoritarianism is Serious Business

“The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism” by Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way provides insight into a type of nondemocratic and non-authoritarian regime into which post-Cold War nations degenerated: Competitive Authoritarianism. This system results when some form of existing democratic institutions within a state provide the principal means for obtaining political power, but autocratic incumbents undermine the rules of these institutions just enough to maintain power unfairly. Basically it is the difference between the substantive and procedural elements of pluralist (in this case, democratic) regimes which King mentioned in lecture. Procedurally, post-Cold War countries like Russia, Ukraine, and Serbia (just a few examples of many provided in the article) appear to possess legitimate democratic elections, but substantively, they typically take on more authoritarian practices. But once one digs deeper into the underlying processes involved in these “democratic” elections, one finds the autocratic incumbents engaging in actions of questionable legality (bribes, threats, and other co-optation devices) to suppress potential opposition parties. Major fraud, such as stacking elections in one’s party’s favor, remains rare among incumbents due to the risks involved, including being removed from office.

“Competitive Authoritarianism (CA)” is a humorously ironic title. Levitsky and Way propose that parties within weak and fragmented states did not possess the resources or ability to successfully repress all opposition to form a purely authoritarian regime. Due to pressures from the victorious, democratic West, they adopted a regime type that contained elements of both democracy and authoritarianism in which parties compete for power to use to repress potential opposing parties to the best of their abilities.

How long does this cycle continue? Is Competitive Authoritarianism a permanent regime type, or will it eventually transition into pure authoritarianism or democracy? For CA countries like those in Africa, the prospects for emerging from the cycle remain grim. Lijphart and Reilly provide an argument for the necessity of a PR type of pluralist system in countries as deeply divided as these. Theirs is a reasonable point; a PR system would create a necessity for balance between groups who are in stark opposition to each under the CA system. Despite this, parties in power enjoy power and see no need for forfeiting it by introducing a new, more representative regime type. What’s more, if the current party in power in a given CA country fails due to a scandal or some other factor, an opposition party would rise to take the reigns. Therefore it’s reasonable to conclude that Competitive Authoritarianism is not merely a stage but a very real regime type in and of itself.

Response #2

I would like to highlight another common element present in many of the articles for this week. Most of the authors underscore the importance of political history, institutional legacies, the type of nondemocratic rule and other structural features in developing and maintaining a functioning and stable 'liberal' democracy.

Fareed Zakaria points out, "Every single country in the Third World that emerged from colonial rule since the Second World War with a population of at least one million (and almost all the smaller colonies as well) with a continuous democratic experience is a former British colony." This is the result, according to Zakaria, of Britain's emphasis on constitutional liberalism, law and administration and not an emphasis on democracy. With the majority of the 'third wave' of democracies shifting to Carothers' 'Gray zone', Zakaria notes, "Constitutional liberalism has led to democracy, but democracy does not seem to bring constitutional liberalism."

Among the five core assumptions that define the transitional period that Carothers examines, the fourth assumption states that, "the underlying conditions in transitional countries will not be major factors in either the onset or the outcome of the transition process." Carothers' disproves this assumption by noting that "Looking at the more successful recent cases of democratization, for example, which tend to be found in Central Europe, the Southern Cone, or East Asia, it is clear that relative economic wealth, as well as past experience with political pluralism, contributes to the chances for democratic success."

Levitsky and Way also note the importance of past institutions and structural features to the success of liberal democracy. They note, "Linkages to the West—in the form of cultural and media influence, elite networks, demonstration effects, and direct pressure from Western governments—appear to have raised the costs of authoritarian entrenchment, making the democratization of competitive authoritarian regimes more likely."

In today's age of fashionable democratic rule, a respectful and nuanced approach to tackling problems arising from the "hybrid" democracies must take into account the history of political, economic and institutional legacies of each country. Such an approach would appreciate the long and difficult progress countries must make in order to become successful democracies and would try to move beyond quick expectations that hinder democratic development.

Response #1

A common theme in this week’s readings was the many faults with not only the “democratization” process, but also the fact that “for better or for worse, we are ‘stuck’ with democracy as the catchword of contemporary political discourse.” It is evident as to how this occurred -- the Soviet collapse and the end of communism as a viable political alternative -- but there remain unanswered questions as to the consequences of democracy’s assumed dominance. This is no better represented than by the widespread use of the transition paradigm, and as per Thomas Carothers, the end of its useful life. While for many years, the assumption was that if countries were moving away from authoritarian rule, it meant that they were moving along a path towards democratization, Carothers believes that this no longer holds true. Instead, the majority of countries have entered a “gray zone” in which countries are “neither dictatorial nor clearly headed toward democracy.”

These “gray zone” countries could be characterized as the hybrid regimes discusses by Levitsky and Way, which are defined as those nations that have “combined democratic rules with authoritarian governance.” In “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy,” Zakaria discusses this same issue under the title of “illiberal democracy,” in which democracy may be present, but constitutional liberalism is not. According to Zakaria, it is more important to facilitate the development of liberal constitutionalism -- as defined by the rule of law, personal freedoms, independent judiciary, etc… -- than to fulfill our misguided view that democratization alone will result in superior governance. This claim is further supported by Schmitter and Karl’s argument that “the specific form democracy takes is contingent upon a country’s…entrenched state structures and policy practices.” Thus, by establishing the necessary institutions of constitutional liberalism, it is possible to prompt countries toward liberal democracy and stop the proliferation of hybrid regimes.

Continuing Trends?

In his article “The End of the Transition Paradigm”, Thomas Carothers argues that the idea that states undergo a natural transition from authoritarianism to a more democratic society is outdated and irrelevant in today’s world. Many of the countries which Western political scientists consider to be “in transition” have not only failed to become liberal democratic states, but some have become even more oppressive. While this may be the case for some countries, the general trends presented by Larry Diamond in his article on hybrid regimes seem to hold true.
Ok, let’s crunch some numbers…
Diamond uses statistics from Freedom House to examine the change in political regimes from 1974 to 2001. Have the trends that he pointed out continued in the last seven years?

2001 2008
Number of liberal democracies 73 79
(1.0-2.0 on the 7- point scale)

Number of repressive regimes 21 17
(6.5-7.0 on the 7-point scale)


1974 2001 2008
Average score worldwide 4.47 3.47 3.23

I have selected a few of the more telling statistics, but similar comparisons by region and regime type offer similar results. It seems, then, that Diamond’s belief in a worldwide transition towards democracy continues to be supported by the data. This offers no insight into any particular country case study, but it does support the classical transition paradigm.

Response #1

As you can see from “A Global Snapshot,” there are about as many electoral systems in existence as there are electors and a state need merely choose which interests or groups to exclude or minimize and which to focus on. It must be understood as stated in the article, the proper system for a group depends on the long history and culture they share, but this fact doesn’t answer the question of which is the best system in general? To me, the best system is the majority system, though it is a matter of utility rather than some notion of justice or fairness.
The majority system avoids the problem of the plurality system whereby the majority of people could have voted against the victorious candidate as we have seen in several US presidential elections, most recently being Bill Clinton in 1992 AND 1996, as well as the current president Bush in 2000. A majority system would seem to increase the effectiveness or properly said the legitimacy of an administration as in order to be in office you need to have a mandate from the people.
It is a relatively simple system, simplicity being crucial to me in the selection of a political system. If a state is going to encourage its populace to vote, and vote voluntarily (Australia are you nuts?) they need to make the system as simple and effective as possible. The majority system would seem to lead to a concentration of power in political parties, perhaps more than plurality as there is at least the viability of a third candidate, but fewer than you would see in preferential or proportional representation. This will create the necessity for internal stability within the party as well as the relative stability of the government as it is not founded on fragile and transient coalitions.
Proportional representation has its merits in that it tries to give more voice to smaller groups, but there is a lot more marginal argument that can undermine the legitimacy of a government. Depending on whether or not you round up or down can determine parliamentary majorities and leads to dissent among the losers. The majority system removes the fringe argument in that there are clearly defined requirements for victory and it can also resist the argument that it ignores the voice of the smaller parties because they are allowed to vote for or against a candidate, though he/she may not be the smaller groups’ ideal choice.
Preferential voting is getting into the realm of being very complicated for the voter. The simplicity of any of the previous systems begins to fall away with this system in that you are imposing artificial mathematical restrictions on voting. This is as opposed to very easily understood concepts like the most votes wins, the person with 50%+1 wins or 40% of the vote corresponds to roughly 40% of the seats. The main criticism I have is that Preferential voting quickly becomes arbitrary. Imagine again the lunacy of the Australian ballot or look at last year with the GUSA presidential elections when it was shown that the order of the candidates on the ballot influenced their proportion of the vote. There is a certain tolerance threshold people have for candidates. It ranges from 1 to an infinite number of people that the populace can actually know, or frankly care about. Asking them to vote on a multitude of candidates is asking too much.
Majority voting is by no means the ideal system, but it leads to an ultimately stable government.

Blog Post #1

Lijphart outlines the possible electoral systems as Plurality and Proportional Representation, and the possible governmental structures as Parliamentary and Presidential. Describing the underlying motivation behind choosing a particular electoral system, he links proportional representation with a coalition government as part of a multi-party system (Reilly calls this “centripetal” government), while he suggests plurality creates two-party systems with a dominant one-party cabinet and executive.  Lijphart notes that presidentialism fosters competition for one office that only the largest parties have the means to compete for. This breeds a culture of two-party politics and the marginalization of fringe parties.

            The United States has a pluralistic voting system and a Presidential government. According to the readings from this week, this makes our system far less representative than others around the world. We place our faith in one powerful executive who can singlehandedly override the will of congress, but who must be overridden by 2/3 of the legislative body to be checked. This executive is chosen by an electorate presented with a choice between two individuals.  In our pluralistic society we must choose the candidate who is aligned with more of our own interests than the other. Our expression of preference is limited to supporting the candidate who agrees with us more often.

            Expressed in these institutions are certain values held by the authors of our system. Our pluralistic voting method demonstrates that we aren’t concerned with reflecting our societal preferences in government as a whole; only the majority’s preferences matter.  Our Presidential system speaks to our desire to have an executive who can act quickly and decisively to solve crises in a way that a representative legislative body cannot. As we are witnessing with the financial crisis however, such action is limited to specific areas such as defense and disaster relief.  This would suggest that as a public we value decisive, unilateral response over the proportionality of our representation in government.  Both of these institutions give rise to the two-party system. Pluralistic elections necessitate a clear definitive choice and Presidential government requires parties that are broad in ideology that encompass enough of the electorate to win a majority of votes. If there is a third party it is bound to overlap with another and neither would be effective.

            I think a lot of the dissatisfaction with the political process in this country stems from the two-party system and the concept of majority rule that accompanies it. Politicians need only conform to 50% + 1 of the population’s demands. Based on the readings, it seems plausible to suggest that the electoral and governmental institutions we have chosen have created this divided climate and by comparison makes the arguments expressed in Ben Reilly’s article about how proportional representation inspires consensus and compromise seem even more valid. There is a lot to be said for our system of government but by limiting our preferences to a choice between two parties we have limited our ability to carry out the will of the country as a whole.

Response 1

Examining the different forms of electoral systems throughout the world, I believe, provides a significant insight to the struggle of new democratizing nations to develop fair, functioning democracies. I largely agree with both Lijphart and Reilly that when dealing with a newly beginning, and more importantly ethnically fissured, democracy the plurality system that we swear by in our American elections is simply too dangerous an option. Both agree that in an ethnically fractured society the need for a minority voice within domestic government overcomes the need for a single party term that can make fast, decisive, but accountable choices. In the US, these plurality system values are concordant and even helpful to our current political status, as although we are very far from being perfect, we have been able to create parties that are not solely tied to an ethnic base. In many new developing nations that hearken back to a strong tribal system of government, voting outside of one’s ethnic group seems wholly inconceivable. With either a plurality system or a preferential system, voters can feel their vote is not wasted, and they will have the opportunity to be represented in their new democracies, encouraging participation and confidence in government. Additionally, as a world superpower, the US is forced to make expedient security and defense decisions, and it is crucial that the players in office are (at least theoretically) held accountable for these decisions. However, in developing nations, where democracy is both a very new system of government but also a new way of thinking of how people are governed, the primary focus is not making expedient decisions from outside pressures, but controlling some of the most detrimental domestic problems of nations, such as ethnic violence, systemic corruption, and majority oppression. This creates a value shift away from the need for strong, accountable manufactured majorities, to a need for varied, representative governments such as PR systems or preferential voting systems.