Response #2: "Reform and Openness"（改革开放）

At the beginning of the semester, Professor King identified performance as a method by which a state can claim legitimacy, in addition to the more traditionally recognized methods. I remember thinking of China as soon as we were discussing this method of legitimation. Although China's CCP lacked the rational/legal method of claiming legitimacy, and it can be argued that the CCP largely lost its charismatic leadership after the death of Mao Zedong, the process of democratization did not occur because the CCP's performance in saving/reforming China's economy has really solidified its claim to legitimacy.

Gallagher points out that the economic reforms and their success has "[bought] the existing regime time to implement politically difficult reforms and to reformulate the ideological foundation of their legitimacy to rule" (372). Since the end of Mao's rule, the CCP has been suffering from a legitimacy deficit. The death of the charismatic leader forced the party to seek ways in which it can consolidate its rule over China, and I believe it has relied on its performance to achieve this. Examples can be the CCP's successful economic policies, successful deterrence of Taiwan from declaring independence, and its successful hosting of the 2008 Beijing Olympics (not to mention that China's "performance" was stellar in the games).

While the argument Gallagher makes is convincing, I challenge her qualification of the general argument that the role of FDI in China's economic reforms "has led to a delay in political change" rather than stopping it altogether (371). I would like to propose at least the possibility of the CCP managing to permanently hold its power and legitimacy in mainland China. Whether this view will hold true is for the future to tell, but we should remain open to this possibility and avoid the democracy-biased view of the transition paradigm theorists, as Carothers would argue. Perhaps the somewhat unconventional coexistance of a capitalist economy (though it is not complete) and authoritarian rule in Mainland China will prove to be viable and stable in the long run.

Why Competition Can Poisonous to the Authoritarian Model

I would like to begin by briefly fleshing out what I take to be the central components of the ‘fragmentation argument’, and then proceed to argue that a far-sided application of Gallagher’s argument is compatible with the Lipset thesis.

This article is primarily intended to preserve the Lipset thesis, which holds that there is a causal flow from economic reform and liberalization to democratization, by explaining how the Chinese model falls outside the parameters of this thesis. Gallagher’s explanation begins by pointing out that the thrust of the reforms under Deng in the mid 70s were designed to bring in more FDI. The success of these reforms throughout the 80s and early 90s caused competition on three levels: 1) SOEs competed between each other for foreign investment and against foreign-financed firms 2) regions competed with each other in an effort to attract more FDI and 3) workers competed against each other for jobs. According to Gallagher, all of this competition dissolves the chance of there being a unified opposition movement since each group is too preoccupied with getting a bigger piece of the investment pie, so to speak.

Not surprisingly, the political reforms that have been achieved have largely been motivated by a desire to put in place those conditions necessary to attract more investment such as clear property rights and a strong legal and judicial system. A major challenge to the Chinese project of political reform is that democratization, per se, does not necessarily attract more investment. In fact, businesses are more concerned with institutional stability and consistency, a characteristic that provides them with the ability to appropriately adjust their expectations of future conditions. Democratization, on the other hand, is a messy process that typically requires a good deal of time before accomplishing any semblance of stability. Seen in this light, it appears as though the Chinese incentive structure for political reform is too weak and is dominated by the short-term gains from maintaining the status quo. However, I believe that the Lipset thesis is ultimately more robust and that the Chinese focus on FDI need not mark the end of opportunities to reform.

What serves as the most promising sign of Chinese political reform is the most discouraging result of its recent economic growth. Although foreign investment has done wonders to China’s per capita GDP, its effect on median income has been nearly negligible. Competing against fellow country men is all well and good when it’s a matter of who is going to win more than the other; however, when one group begins to consistently win at the expense of the others, the character of interest group politics changes to one of hostility and perceived oppression. In conclusion, the gains from FDI certainly ushered in a new era of competition in China that did away with the socialist model; but the skewed distribution of the gains might well serve as the impetus for political change.

Response 2

In reading Mary Gallagher’s article on the lagging process of democratization in China despite the growth of capitalism and market principles, I was struck by the extent to which the Communist Party in China has actually abandoned many of the traditionally socialist values in order to make way for market principles. As Gallagher traces the history of Foreign Direct Investment in China, we see that the various regions and private enterprises of China have embraced competition as a necessary element of the modern economy in order to make China, its labor, and its skilled workers competitive. Furthermore, as China continues to develop, the general failure of state-owned organizations (Gallagher notes that almost half were losing money in the 1990s, and that while they are only responsible for about 30% of the country’s industrial growth they consume 70% of its loans) only points to the likelihood of an increase in the use of market principles in China’s future (Gallagher 352).
Yet the Communist Party has brilliantly reformulated itself as a party of national interest rather than economic or class interest. Gallagher notes that even though the ruling Communist regime has increasingly embraced capitalist principles, the change is “framed as being in the national interest and as essential for national economic survival in an increasing globalized economy” (345). In light of this, I think that the modern Chinese Communist Party is best labeled as an authoritarian party that relies on nationalism and a thriving economy to support its platform rather than any fixed ideological principles. As long as people are willing to tolerate this regime for the benefit of the performance of the nation as a whole, China will remain the exception to the theories first started by Lipset about ties between economic and political change.
However, even though Gallagher’s article emphasizes China’s exception to these paradigms, she herself can’t overlook the fact that legal institutions are growing, albeit only to mediate economic conflicts. She also notes that as incomes grow, citizens are gaining access to lawyers and a greater consciousness about civil and political rights (Gallagher 371). It will be interesting to see how much further the “Communist” party is willing to adapt and change as these institutions become more entrenched through China’s increased contact with the global market. Though it is certainly a strong and unified party, the extent to which it is able to dictate its future versus the extent to which it must adapt should itself be a marker of the progress China is making, even if the party itself has not been ousted from power in the traditional democratizing pattern we have seen elsewhere in the world.

Response #1

Pierre Hassner’s article “Russia’s Transition to Autocracy,” alluded to a previous week’s reading Seymour Lipset’s “Economic Development and Democracy.” At first read, I saw no correlation between Lipset’s ideology and Hassner’s article. And although Hassner praised Lipset’s academic research, after reading his article, I came to the conclusion that Russia’s current state contradicts Lipset’s belief that economic development and urbanization lead to democratic values in a society. His mandates are still part of palimentary and electoral procedures, yet they are completely lacking of constitutional liberalism. Apart from the rising capitalistic culture, there seems to be more at play in Russia than just economic development that leads to democracy. Other factors have affected the course of politics in addition to economic principles. Russia’s political culture has been more than welcoming to the type of autocratic leadership that Putin has instituted. “While most Russians are aware of and condemn the regime's human rights violations, and in principle favor liberal democracy, they are also grateful to Putin for restoring Russia's international power and authority” (Hassner). The main issue at stake in Russia, based on Pierre Hassner’s article is whether democratic values should be sacrificed for the sake of international power. Putin provides the strong leadership Russians want, yet has encroached on freedom of the press and, brutally, eliminated potential opposition and increased xenophobia. Putin’s popularity, in spite of his harsh ruling, reminded me of Fareed Zakaria’s illiberal democracy ideal.

Blog 11/5

In the readings for this week, I found the presentation of post-communist countries, particularly post-communist Russia, to be interrelated.  I was most intrigued by what to me seems to be a connection between Howard’s article and Hasner’s article. Hasner articulates the shift in attitude of Russian government toward the west in the recent past. He suggests that Russia, like other countries in the region, seemed to be headed for a democratic system of government. Somewhere along the way, Putin came to power, and despite President Bush looking into his soul, by 2003 Russia’s official stance toward the West echoed cold war era propaganda.  There was a turn away from democracy and toward autocracy in Russia. Howard’s article claims that there is a significant lack of civil society present in post-communist countries. He explains that this is the case for a variety of reasons, not least of which is a general distrust of communal institutions, since under socialist rule citizens were obliged to participate in them, often against their will. I am curious after reading these two articles if anyone has explored the connection between the two phenomena presented. Though admittedly I am less than knowledgeable about the specifics of civil society in Russia and other nearby states, it strikes me as only natural that weak civil society allows for easier subversion of democracy and a smoother path to autocracy.  As far as I am concerned, a lack of significant civil society means a lack of engagement in the government at the level of the everyday individual. Antipathy would seem to be the prevailing mood. Civil society then, is a reflection of the level to which a society cares about its own governance. If a society doesn’t care, it will be swept up by a government that does, and what that government generally cares about is increasing and maintaining its own dominance.  Howard touches on this in his article, saying, “with civic organizations lacking the active support of the population, such a hollow democracy will remain at risk of being toppled by hostile forces, whether based on nondemocratic historical traditions or a new antidemocratic ideology.” I would be interested to read an article that further articulates or debunks this notion, as it seems an entirely logical one to me. If you consider the U.S., with our hundreds of thousands of public organizations, it is hard to imagine a culture of antipathy toward government. We are accustomed to people belonging to groups who have specific agendas and it is ridiculous to imagine our country turning toward an authoritarian system. There would be widespread, organized public outcry. Without a civil society to defend itself, democracy in other parts of world seems far more apt to crumble.

Response #2

The new Russia under Putin’s rule has considerably changed both domestically and internationally. Putin is indeed an autocratic ruler. Hasner starts out by saying, “no matter how dubious public opinions polls or how rigged elections are in Russia, a majority of the people still support Putin” (3). One reason for this, and something that I found quite interesting in this article, could be the concept of deception. It is a predominant strategy that is used by Putin that seeks to “maintain the appearance of democracy while progressively emptying democratic institutions of their content” (4). This is also known as “virtual” or “imitation” democracy. Another reason that the people may feel the need to support Putin is because even though he has done a poor job of creating institutions, civil society, and a rule of law, he has improved Russians’ economic status. Putin at times also showed genuine support the United States, especially in cooperating with terrorism and his immediate offer to support the US after 9/11.

But after 2003, this relationship changed dramatically. And Hassner points out that the evolution of Putin’s policies is heading in the wrong direction. A key aspect of this idea is that many of his policies are strongly reminiscent of fascism. Putin has eliminated any rival centers of power and has also engaged in the “personality cult” by proclaiming himself “leader of the nation.” Post Communist Russia is becoming more and more authoritarian, and it is also showing greater hostility towards its neighbors—Estonia and Georgia, and especially the West. Putin thought that by converting towards democracy Russia would automatically become a duopoly, but that is not the case. I think that Dmitri Trenin sums it when he states, “what Russia craves is respect. It does not want to be a junior partner—it wants to be an equal” (7).

Response #2

My belief is that when it comes to discussing the new Russia, we are once again faced by the challenge of what to do if “free and fair” elections are held, and the people elect, in this instance, an undemocratic ruler. Based on the reading by Pierre Hasner, as well as the view of the international community in general, there is simply no doubting that Vladimir Putin is an autocratic ruler. Today’s Russia lacks the institutions, civil society, and rule of law that characterize a liberal democracy as defined earlier in the semester by Fareed Zakaria. Yet, at the same time, it is believed that the majority of Russians still support Putin, even when considering the dubiousness of public opinion polls. The explanation of this dilemma is rather simple, for as Hasner points out, “[Putin’s] rule is full of contradictions”. Indeed, this is not surprising, as a democracy in line with Russian traditions may well be expected to be full of contradictions, especially since Russia has been historically-conditioned to a single, dominant head of state. While Putin has not hesitated to curtail freedom of expression and has effectively destroyed any notion of a free press, he has succeeded in improving Russia’s economic well-being and, at times, specifically early in his career, has assisted the U.S. and Europe in addressing key international issues. However, there remains serious cause for concern according to Hasner, due to the fact that the trajectory of Putin’s policies is headed in the wrong direction. Not only is there a definitive trend towards increased authoritarianism in Russia’s domestic policies, but also growing hostility towards its neighbors and the West, as well as socio-political trends “reminiscent of fascism”. To justify this last statement, Hasner points to both the elimination of rival power centers and the growing “personality cult” of Putin that evokes memories of the late Turkmenbashi. Furthermore, Russia has gained greater political clout since the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the recent rise in commodities prices. Indeed, this may be one of Putin’s pillars of popular support, because, as Hasner points out, many Russians are “grateful to Putin for restoring Russia’s international power and authority”. But as for the implications of these trends, we must consider the new dynamic of international politics. As Russia struggles through its post-communist transition, the U.S. remains strong, Europe continues to become more united, and China has enjoyed a meteoric rise. Thus, the whole dynamic of Russian foreign relations may soon be forced to change. However, in the near future, the world must be weary of the possible impacts of an illiberal democracy in a country as important to global politics as Russia.