Now that we have spent a whole semester comparing many different political systems it is easy to see how the many complexities involved with politics makes it difficult to understand why certain states function as they do. During the semester we studied numerous theories in order to understand why so many different systems have developed and how they function today. By doing so, we learned how the effects of globalization, democratization, modernization, capitalism, and ethnicity, etc., have contributed to the development of different political systems.
Starting with the satellite nations of the Soviet Union that developed as a result of the Cold War, we can see how the issue of ethnicity has led to territorial problems. In many cases the rapid development of these nations resulted in instabilities especially when ethnic diversity was added to the mix. With this said, the violence that resulted from the development of these nations has caused their systems of government to fail over and over. Even in the satellite nations that have democratized to the point of electing officials, many of the elections are still rigged leaving many nations as illiberal democracies.
Aside from the many Eastern European nations who have failed to fully democratize nations such as China and Russia have also remained non-democratic. Some have argued that Russia has moved further ahead of China when it comes to democratization however it is clear that both nations are reluctant to fully democratize. One of the main reasons for this reluctance is the state power that communism enables. With this, the fact that both China and Russia have remained both powerful and communist makes it hard to believe that either nation truly wishes to forgo their communist systems. China and Russia alike are nations with large geographical boundaries which may be one reason why the leaders these nations insist on state control. Along with this, with such high populations, especially in China, the potential for a governmental overthrow is highly feared. As a result, the implementation of fear by the state has been a way for these nations to prevent such uprisings.
When looking at these two instances of failed economic development we can see how many different factors contribute to the ideologies behind these nations systems. In the case of the slowly democratizing satellite nations one reason for the failure to fully democratize has been a product of the people and ethnic ties. In the case of China and Russia, failure to democratize is not so much a result of its people but rather the state.
Wednesday, December 3, 2008
Friday, November 21, 2008
Violent Past; Shady Present
I feel that violence has been an inherent facet of Islam since the religion’s very inception. The Arab world at the time of Muhammad’s hermitic revelations comprised a series of tribal entities that very often fought for power. Elections were unheard of, and violence was the primary tool used to obtain and maintain power which was centered in the Muslim holy land of Mecca.
Muhammad himself was banished to Medina along with his followers by the tribal family who held power at the time because they felt threatened by this up and coming movement. Unsurprisingly, Muhammad’s “Islam” gained quite a following during his exile, and he later returned with all of his followers to wage war (okay maybe that’s an overstatement, but there was violence is my point) to reclaim Mecca. After Muhammad, a series of power struggles most often ultimately decided by bloodshed (assassination, violent disputes etc.) determined who would next be in charge. When Islam began grounding itself throughout the society such that unification became possible, Islamic empires such as the Umayyad and the Abbasid rose to conquer their vast territories.
That’s not to say other religions are historically clean of violence. However, the head figures of religions such as Christianity and Buddhism did not lead followers to conquer holy lands. In terms of Christianity, violent struggles for power were mostly unheard of. Certainly, rather un-Christian power struggles between popes and kings occurred, and by the time of Charlemagne and after his three-way division of his empire, political backstabbing (literal and figurative) became far more commonplace. Then, of course, there were the Crusades.
It was through such desires for political stature and might that religions began losing sight of the messages they taught (well, as far as I know Buddhism never really did ß-digression). I wish I were more fluent in Islam’s teachings so I could speak more clearly on the issue of whether the religion itself can possibly lead to a sustainable liberal-democratic style of governing. Wittes believes we should take into account three issues: how fairly Muslims believe minorities and women should be treated (in light of the fact that Islam apparently does not feel them deserving of equal rights), how open to pluralism a Muslim government would be, and whether or not the religious branch would “veto power over the democratic process” (Wittes 10).
One important question regarding this topic that Wittes asks is: “If language is often vague and behavior often contradictory, how does one know whether apparent moderation is real?” (Wittes 10-11). Considering this sort of strategic ambiguity and taking into account the violently turbulent roots of the Muslim world and Islam leaves me feeling somewhat suspicious. Additionally, Wittes notes the lack of political freedom in these societies which leaves the Muslim party with no real incentive to discuss its political ideologies. After all, political ideology only shines when a party has to stick to and defend it against an opposing party that threatens to bring to power its own ideology.
Why should language be vague unless its user is hiding something? I am not one for discrimination, but I do support full openness and honesty, for only through these can any two conscious entities—be they small as people or as large as nations—come to a trusting relationship between each other.
Wednesday, November 19, 2008
Submission #2: Civil Society in Developing Nations
In “Ethnicity and Development in Africa: A Reappraisal” Robert Gates creates a picture of the development of civil society in Africa and its influence on economic stability and development. His insight into a small town in Zambia provides a useful rival alternative to traditional western civil society.
Whereas in western industrialized countries, civil society is much more focused on external connections, be it the Boy Scouts or Rotary Club, connections based on interactions within the community. This is in stark contrast to Gates example where there is a much stronger focus on family and its interaction in the community and society. Although it is different, it is not to say less successful on a micro level, and in fact elicits some of the same benefits. Traditional Civil society is good for incubating positive social relations and improvements in all facets of life. Likewise, in the African village, the connections are overall beneficial since an investment in the children is shown to yield positive returns for the family. This arrangement seems likely to continue as long as it is a wise investment, just as community groups in the West function as long as they continue to achieve their goals.
Similar to western civil society, there are ways of coercing behavior through various sanctions to maintain cohesion. In western society, there are things such as membership dues and fines for bad conduct that help to maintain the proper environment for functioning civil society just as in the African town, the social pressures exerted by the middle age generation help to keep the youth in line, for there is a price to pay for the valuable education they are receiving. In both cases, this social pressure helps maintain a successful system.
The important thing to realize is that although they are different, both systems seem to fit the situation and achieve the goal of strong social bonds and civil society.
Whereas in western industrialized countries, civil society is much more focused on external connections, be it the Boy Scouts or Rotary Club, connections based on interactions within the community. This is in stark contrast to Gates example where there is a much stronger focus on family and its interaction in the community and society. Although it is different, it is not to say less successful on a micro level, and in fact elicits some of the same benefits. Traditional Civil society is good for incubating positive social relations and improvements in all facets of life. Likewise, in the African village, the connections are overall beneficial since an investment in the children is shown to yield positive returns for the family. This arrangement seems likely to continue as long as it is a wise investment, just as community groups in the West function as long as they continue to achieve their goals.
Similar to western civil society, there are ways of coercing behavior through various sanctions to maintain cohesion. In western society, there are things such as membership dues and fines for bad conduct that help to maintain the proper environment for functioning civil society just as in the African town, the social pressures exerted by the middle age generation help to keep the youth in line, for there is a price to pay for the valuable education they are receiving. In both cases, this social pressure helps maintain a successful system.
The important thing to realize is that although they are different, both systems seem to fit the situation and achieve the goal of strong social bonds and civil society.
Response #2
Throughout Robyn Meredith’s The Elephant and the Dragon, there are multiple references to the rising Tata Group of India. A few months ago, in the mist of the U.S. economic strife, I remember reading a New York Times article “New Life for Jaguar Under Tata Motors” on the purchase of Jaguar Cars Ltd. by Tata Motors, part of the Tata Group, from Ford Motor Company.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/04/automobiles/04TATA.html
Tata Motors has clearly grown to challenge the stronghold US companies have on not only the luxury car industry but the fuel efficient, economic car market as well. Tata motors “recently created a stir by introducing a new car for India, the Nano, which costs just $2,500”. Tata Motors is only one fraction of the Tata conglomerate whose dominion is diverse and far reaching including steel, tea, watches, and publishing (New Life for Jaguar). I could not think of one US industry whose reach is as diverse as that of the Tata Group.
Rereading the New York Times article after having read Robyn Meredith’s book, it reinforced Meredith’s point of India’s rising status. Recent developments in the Tata-Ford deal has shown that India's dependence on the US economy has lead to an instability within the country. The recent strain on the three car giants-GM, Ford, and Chrysler-has affected Tata Motors as well. As a result, some of the Tata Motor plants have already ceased production (Motor Industry Caught in Eye of Storm) http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/motors/2008/1119/1227026408003.html
The Tata-Ford deal defies some of the assumed results of India’s rise. Meredith focuses a great deal on “offshoring,” or the transfer of jobs from one country to another. Offshoring seems to be a probable outcome of the Tata-Ford deal, yet “Tata has pledged to retain most of the companies employees and managers” (New Life for Jaguar). This serves as a reassurance for the US's ailing workforce.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/04/automobiles/04TATA.html
Tata Motors has clearly grown to challenge the stronghold US companies have on not only the luxury car industry but the fuel efficient, economic car market as well. Tata motors “recently created a stir by introducing a new car for India, the Nano, which costs just $2,500”. Tata Motors is only one fraction of the Tata conglomerate whose dominion is diverse and far reaching including steel, tea, watches, and publishing (New Life for Jaguar). I could not think of one US industry whose reach is as diverse as that of the Tata Group.
Rereading the New York Times article after having read Robyn Meredith’s book, it reinforced Meredith’s point of India’s rising status. Recent developments in the Tata-Ford deal has shown that India's dependence on the US economy has lead to an instability within the country. The recent strain on the three car giants-GM, Ford, and Chrysler-has affected Tata Motors as well. As a result, some of the Tata Motor plants have already ceased production (Motor Industry Caught in Eye of Storm) http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/motors/2008/1119/1227026408003.html
The Tata-Ford deal defies some of the assumed results of India’s rise. Meredith focuses a great deal on “offshoring,” or the transfer of jobs from one country to another. Offshoring seems to be a probable outcome of the Tata-Ford deal, yet “Tata has pledged to retain most of the companies employees and managers” (New Life for Jaguar). This serves as a reassurance for the US's ailing workforce.
Globalization, Globalism, and Globality
During lecture this week, professor King pointed out the difficulty of defining the commonly used word, "globalization". The overuse of this word in perhaps too many contexts without careful discrimination has virtually made this word devoid of any meaning--or perhaps rendered the word to mean anything. I hope to provide a useful set of definitions that might clear up the confusion regarding the word.
In Globalization of the "A Very Short Introduction" series (British Politics, you will remember, is also of the series), Manfred B. Steger attempts to define this multifaceted and multidimensional term. Steger, while acknowledging that "there exists no scholarly consensus" on the essence of globalization, outlines the "thematic overlap in various scholarly attempts" to define this term (Steger 9).
1. "Globalization involves the creation of new and the multiplication of existing social networks and activities that increasingly overcome traditional political, economic, cultural, and geographical boundaries."
2. "The second quality of globalization is reflected in the expansion and the stretching of social relations, activities, and interdependencies."
3. "Third, globalization involves the intensification and acceleration of social exchanges and activities."
4. Finally, globalization "[fosters] in people a growing awarenss of deepening connections between the local and the distant."
(9-13)
While this quick outline does not do justice to Steger's systematic attempt to define the term, one thing we should note is the fact that globalization refers to a set of processes, and shouldn't be confused with the terms globalism and globality.
Globalism: "an ideology that endows the concept of globalization with neoliberal values and meanings" (94)
Globality: "[signifies] a social condition characterized by the existence of global economic, political, cultural, and environmental interconnections and flows that make many of the currently existing borders and boundaries irrelevant." (7)
To sum it up, globalization is a SET OF PROCESSES, globalism is AN IDEOLOGY, and globality is a CONDITION. Steger's criticisms against the ideology of globalism is as follows:
1. Oversimplification of the term globalization by equating the multidimensional set of processes as a mere global integration of markets.
2. The idea that globalization is inevitable and irreversable: a teleological perspective.
3. The view that nobody but the 'invisible hand' and technology are responsible for globalization (and its negative effects), thereby demobilizing antiglobalist movements.
4. The view that globalization benefits everyone.
With these terms defined, I think an interesting discussion can follow regarding where Meredith stands. Can Meredith be accused of espousing globalism, the ideology? There is a good argument to be made for the affirmative, but I would say no. While her book heavily emphasizes the economic developments of India and China, i.e. the economic dimension of globalism, she is not writing on globalization per se, nor does she claim to do so. Second, she posits the future of the two countries' economies as more integrated and open, but she balances it with the prospects of political obstacles that may hinder this development. It may be somewhat more difficult to free Meredith from Steger's third criticism. Meredith's book gives the impression that the culprit behind the job destruction in the U.S. and low wages for Chinese factory workers is none other than the 'invisible hand', market forces over which individuals have no control. But maybe that is simply true, and we shouldn't be in the business of pointing fingers at economic participants; perhaps we should seek to remedy these negative effects through channels such as improving education in the U.S. Finally, Meredith balances the good effects of the economic dimension of globalization (e.g. creation of jobs, higher standards of living) with the bad effects (e.g. job losses, environmental issues).
In Globalization of the "A Very Short Introduction" series (British Politics, you will remember, is also of the series), Manfred B. Steger attempts to define this multifaceted and multidimensional term. Steger, while acknowledging that "there exists no scholarly consensus" on the essence of globalization, outlines the "thematic overlap in various scholarly attempts" to define this term (Steger 9).
1. "Globalization involves the creation of new and the multiplication of existing social networks and activities that increasingly overcome traditional political, economic, cultural, and geographical boundaries."
2. "The second quality of globalization is reflected in the expansion and the stretching of social relations, activities, and interdependencies."
3. "Third, globalization involves the intensification and acceleration of social exchanges and activities."
4. Finally, globalization "[fosters] in people a growing awarenss of deepening connections between the local and the distant."
(9-13)
While this quick outline does not do justice to Steger's systematic attempt to define the term, one thing we should note is the fact that globalization refers to a set of processes, and shouldn't be confused with the terms globalism and globality.
Globalism: "an ideology that endows the concept of globalization with neoliberal values and meanings" (94)
Globality: "[signifies] a social condition characterized by the existence of global economic, political, cultural, and environmental interconnections and flows that make many of the currently existing borders and boundaries irrelevant." (7)
To sum it up, globalization is a SET OF PROCESSES, globalism is AN IDEOLOGY, and globality is a CONDITION. Steger's criticisms against the ideology of globalism is as follows:
1. Oversimplification of the term globalization by equating the multidimensional set of processes as a mere global integration of markets.
2. The idea that globalization is inevitable and irreversable: a teleological perspective.
3. The view that nobody but the 'invisible hand' and technology are responsible for globalization (and its negative effects), thereby demobilizing antiglobalist movements.
4. The view that globalization benefits everyone.
With these terms defined, I think an interesting discussion can follow regarding where Meredith stands. Can Meredith be accused of espousing globalism, the ideology? There is a good argument to be made for the affirmative, but I would say no. While her book heavily emphasizes the economic developments of India and China, i.e. the economic dimension of globalism, she is not writing on globalization per se, nor does she claim to do so. Second, she posits the future of the two countries' economies as more integrated and open, but she balances it with the prospects of political obstacles that may hinder this development. It may be somewhat more difficult to free Meredith from Steger's third criticism. Meredith's book gives the impression that the culprit behind the job destruction in the U.S. and low wages for Chinese factory workers is none other than the 'invisible hand', market forces over which individuals have no control. But maybe that is simply true, and we shouldn't be in the business of pointing fingers at economic participants; perhaps we should seek to remedy these negative effects through channels such as improving education in the U.S. Finally, Meredith balances the good effects of the economic dimension of globalization (e.g. creation of jobs, higher standards of living) with the bad effects (e.g. job losses, environmental issues).
Reflections on Development Lectures and Economics of Transition Economies
First off, it may seem like a trivial distinction, but inefficiencies and lack of innovation incentives of SOEs did not result from a lack of competition, per se, as was brought up in today's lecture. In fact, we see many monopolies in industrialized, market-based economies that try to cut costs wherever possible because they reap the rewards of increasing profit. SOEs, on the other hand, did not stand to benefit from cost-cutting technological innovation and, therefore, lacked innovation incentives.
More broadly, I think there is a Part B, so to speak, that was omitted from the discussion of the development of development economics. This part of the story begins with the fact that beginning in the mid to early 1970s, the development communities in South Asia, Africa and Latin America built the required infrastructure, taught the technicians, assisted the economists and ministers, and so on. In other words, everything you would think needed to be done....was done. A skeptic might ask, "Where are these roads and bridges you speak of? And why aren't the governments filled with competent leaders?" The short answer is that the runways are right where they were left...they just happen to under about a foot of dirt; and the experts are there, too...they're just not in office. The more serious answer is that the sort of programs and projects completed by development teams is the sort that requires a great degree of maintenance, and maintence requires a great degree of funding. Despite all that the development community has done to help alleviate poverty, the amount of funding that most of these countries receive as a percentage of their GDP is quite small; in the case of India, it's almost neglible. In other words, the development community faces strictly binding funding constraints that make it impossible to both buid everything AND maintain it. That being said, the definition of development surely has to at least include a sustainability component, after all, how can a country temporarily succeed in development? Eventually, the development community realized that the lack of maintanence stemmed from a lack of a feeling of ownership or agency; those projects that tended to benefit from upkeep were those that were at least partially envisioned and championed by the recipient country. Therefore, the progression within the field of development in recent years has been to hand over the reigns to the country receiving assistance since a project can only be successful if it is given long-term maintanence funding, which happens over the long-run only with those projects that are internally deemed to be of great import (which isn't to say that delegates of the Washington Consensus don't try to plead their case). In practice, development of this sort turns out largely to be on a project by project basis; when a country or community asks for assisstance in building a well, let's say, the success of the project is based on how the well serves the community as opposed to its projected effect on long-term income growth. It is for this reason that I was disappointed to hear Professor King belittle the good the comes from particular projects and programs. The development of development economics has shown these sorts of programs, provided they are supported by the recipient country, are really the only avenue available to outsiders who want to help alleviate suffering around the world. The grandiose, macro-level projects that King claimed define the true field of development (taking a page out of the Palin book of "real" dichotomies) have not been successful over the long-run. To summarize, only those projects, programs or policies that are embraced/championed/envisioned by the recipient country stand a chance of producing sustainable development improvements.
Finally, I'd like to bring up an article titled "Institution Building and Growth in Transition Economies" (Beck and Laeven 2006) that seeks to explain the divergence in GDP growth between Central and Eastern European countries and former Soviet Union countries in terms of institutional development, which itself is a function of the entrenchment of elites and the richness of natural resources. This article is particularly relevant since its causality differs from Lipset: political and geographic factors --> institutional development --> economic growth. The intuition being that socialist elites who had been in office a long time in countries rich with natural resources were out to capture rents instead of being fully committed to building strong, market-based/compatible institutions.
More broadly, I think there is a Part B, so to speak, that was omitted from the discussion of the development of development economics. This part of the story begins with the fact that beginning in the mid to early 1970s, the development communities in South Asia, Africa and Latin America built the required infrastructure, taught the technicians, assisted the economists and ministers, and so on. In other words, everything you would think needed to be done....was done. A skeptic might ask, "Where are these roads and bridges you speak of? And why aren't the governments filled with competent leaders?" The short answer is that the runways are right where they were left...they just happen to under about a foot of dirt; and the experts are there, too...they're just not in office. The more serious answer is that the sort of programs and projects completed by development teams is the sort that requires a great degree of maintenance, and maintence requires a great degree of funding. Despite all that the development community has done to help alleviate poverty, the amount of funding that most of these countries receive as a percentage of their GDP is quite small; in the case of India, it's almost neglible. In other words, the development community faces strictly binding funding constraints that make it impossible to both buid everything AND maintain it. That being said, the definition of development surely has to at least include a sustainability component, after all, how can a country temporarily succeed in development? Eventually, the development community realized that the lack of maintanence stemmed from a lack of a feeling of ownership or agency; those projects that tended to benefit from upkeep were those that were at least partially envisioned and championed by the recipient country. Therefore, the progression within the field of development in recent years has been to hand over the reigns to the country receiving assistance since a project can only be successful if it is given long-term maintanence funding, which happens over the long-run only with those projects that are internally deemed to be of great import (which isn't to say that delegates of the Washington Consensus don't try to plead their case). In practice, development of this sort turns out largely to be on a project by project basis; when a country or community asks for assisstance in building a well, let's say, the success of the project is based on how the well serves the community as opposed to its projected effect on long-term income growth. It is for this reason that I was disappointed to hear Professor King belittle the good the comes from particular projects and programs. The development of development economics has shown these sorts of programs, provided they are supported by the recipient country, are really the only avenue available to outsiders who want to help alleviate suffering around the world. The grandiose, macro-level projects that King claimed define the true field of development (taking a page out of the Palin book of "real" dichotomies) have not been successful over the long-run. To summarize, only those projects, programs or policies that are embraced/championed/envisioned by the recipient country stand a chance of producing sustainable development improvements.
Finally, I'd like to bring up an article titled "Institution Building and Growth in Transition Economies" (Beck and Laeven 2006) that seeks to explain the divergence in GDP growth between Central and Eastern European countries and former Soviet Union countries in terms of institutional development, which itself is a function of the entrenchment of elites and the richness of natural resources. This article is particularly relevant since its causality differs from Lipset: political and geographic factors --> institutional development --> economic growth. The intuition being that socialist elites who had been in office a long time in countries rich with natural resources were out to capture rents instead of being fully committed to building strong, market-based/compatible institutions.
Response Two
Through her book, Meredith does a good job in opening the discussion of the basic ethical arguments for and against free trade with China and India. It can be hard to ignore the fact that workers in India and China who are becoming increasingly employed by foreign firms (often times American firms) are getting paid only a small fraction of the money that a worker in the United States would make for doing the same job. It then can seem on the surface to be one of the great ethical debates in free trade whether foreign companies are truly helping domestic workers by providing jobs, or simply exploiting them to receive higher cooperate profits. Is it a situation of the very rich get richer and the poor stay poor? However, Meredith rightly argues that in a situation of comparative advantage both countries receive long-term gains. In basic economic theory, the principle of comparative advantage shows that free trade between countries that have a comparative advantage in different goods will actually increase the welfare for both countries. Labor abundant countries, for example, can produce labor-intensive goods relatively more efficiently than capital abundant countries can produce those same goods. This in turn leaves each country room to specialize in the goods which they are relatively better at producing (like manufacturing jobs in china and high technology innovation in the United States.) Increased efficiency in the markets will lead to lower prices and a high quantity that both countries can consume, effectively increasing welfare in both countries. Foreign workers that are receiving a small fraction of what the same work would be paid for in the United States are increasing welfare not because they are equally as well off as a worker is in the United States, but they are relatively more well off than they were before. To the question of if it is ethical to pay a worker two or three dollars a day to work in a clothing factory, one must ask first if the worker is better off now than he was in autarky with no trade making less than a dollar a day.
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